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COMMENTS
Violence in the Workplace: Reevaluating
the Employer's Role
ANN E. PHILLIPSt
Diana Havner was an overnight clerk at an unsecured Texas
convenience store. While on routine patrol in the early morning
hours, a police officer discovered Diana's car out front, the store
unlocked, an empty cash register and Havner missing. Four days
later, her badly mutilated body, still cloaked in her employer's
smock, was found naked from the waist down with her skull
crushed.'
In Washington, D.C., an armed robber entered a bank, went
directly to Zonya Grillo Durham, the teller nearest the front door,
leaned over the counter and shot her in the head. A few years ear-
lier the bank had removed all protective glass from the tellers'
counters as part of an overall architectural plan to make the inside
look more historical. In response to employee requests to have it
replaced, the bank refused stating it was too expensive and was not
effective in preventing robberies.'
Jason Bercaw's Illinois employer allowed him to deliver a
pizza alone to a man named "Mr. Jones" calling from a pay phone
in an unsafe area. The employer's franchisor provided materials
outlining safety procedures to protect delivery persons such as Ja-
son, but his employer failed to train him in this regard. While at-
tempting to deliver the pizza, Jason was strangled and killed.'
Cherlyn Peavler was working in her employer's plant in Indi-
ana when her boyfriend entered the plant and shot her to death.
At the time of the shooting there were no security guards at the
plant and the boyfriend did not have to report to anyone before
t J.D. Candidate, May 1996, State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law.
The author would like to thank Professor Dianne Avery for suggesting the topic.
1. Havner v. E-Z Mart Stores, Inc., 825 S.W.2d 456, 456-57 (Tex. 1992).
2. Grillo ex rel. Durham v. National Bank of Wash., 540 A.2d 743, 744-46 (D.C. 1988).
3. Bercaw v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 630 N.E.2d 166, 167-68 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
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entering. Having escorted her boyfriend out on a previous occasion,
Cherlyn's employer was well aware of the danger he posed.'
INTRODUCTION
Homicide is the second-most common manner of workplace
death in the United States. It is the leading manner in which
women are fatally injured at work.6 According to recent statistics,
each day criminal attacks in the workplace account for the death
of three people and serious injury of sixty-one others.7 While tragic
4. Peavler v. Mitchell & Scott Mach. Co., 638 N.E.2d 879, 880 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
5. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, No. 94-384, NATIONAL CENSUS OF
FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES, 1993, 1 (1994) [hereinafter CENSUS]; see also Guy Toscano &
Janice Windau, The Changing Character of Fatal Work Injuries, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Oct.
1994, at 17 [hereinafter Changing Character]; Janice Windau & Guy Toscano, Workplace
Homicides in 1992, in FATAL WORKPLACE INJURIES IN 1992: A COLLECTION OF DATA AND
ANALYSIS 11, 11 (BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, Apr. 1994). Homicide is
the leading cause of work-related death in Alabama, Connecticut, Maryland, Michigan,
South Carolina, and the District of Columbia. See Vehicle Crashes Top Other Workplace
Hazards; Homicides Emerge as Major Occupational Threat, 23 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 27,
at 805 (Dec. 1, 1993); Homicides Surpass Motor Vehicle Crashes as Cause of Workplace
Fatalities in Texas, 22 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 48, at 2139 (May 18, 1993); see also Homi-
cide Major Cause of On-the-Job Death, Federal-State Study Finds for New York Area, 23
O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 876 (Dec. 22, 1993). One in six violent crimes occurs in the
workplace. See Justice Report on Workplace Violence Confirms Trend Already Noted by
SHRM, PR NEWSWIRE, July 22, 1994, at 0722DC030.
Criminologists call the workplace homicide trend the fastest growing form of murder in
America. Robert H. Elliott & Deborah T. Jarrett, Violence in the Workplace: The Role of
Human Resource Management, 23 PUB. PERSONNEL MGMT. 287 (1994). But see Richard
Blow, Stamped Out, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 10-17, 1994, at 11; Jan H. Schut, Killers Among
Us; Violence in the Workplace, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Aug. 1994, at 125. While recogni-
tion of the problem of workplace homicide has increased, figures on workplace homicide are
not truly reflective of the problem because "existing studies have been conducted very dif-
ferently, and many are either quite recent or outdated." Id.
6. CENSUS, supra note 5, at 1; BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR No.
94-10, VIOLENCE IN THE WORKPLACE COMES UNDER CLOSER SCRUTINY (1994) [hereinafter
SCRUTINY]; Janice Windau & Guy Toscano, Workplace Homicides in 1992, in FATAL WORK-
PLACE INJURIES IN 1992: A COLLECTION OF DATA AND ANALYSIS 11, 11 (BUREAU OF LABOR STA-
TISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, Apr. 1994). Homicide was the cause of death of approximately
41% of the women killed on the job in the last decade. Decline in Workplace Deaths Re-
ported; Role of Homicide, Motor Vehicles Detailed, 22 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at 2020
(Apr. 28, 1993) [hereinafter Decline].
7. See SCRUTINY, supra note 6 (based on 1,063 work related homicides per year). The
statistic reflecting serious injury of sixty-one workers per day was calculated by including
only those workers who were required to take off one or more workdays due to the injury,
but on average, five days were required for the worker to recuperate. Id. Forty-six percent of
these victims were hit, kicked or beaten, and 23% were raped or threatened. More than
22,000 Violent Non-Fatal Attacks Reported in the Workplace, BLS Report Says, 24 O.S.H.
Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 907 (Sept. 7, 1994). Non-fatal workplace violence affects one of four
workers each year. See Bill D. Hager, Defusing Workplace Violence: Mission Possible, 15
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mass murders committed by disgruntled workers or jealous spouses
immediately come to mind,8 statistics reveal these types of events
only account for fourteen percent of the criminal attacks upon
workers.9 An overwhelming majority of criminal attacks, seventy-
five percent, arise during the course of armed robberies and other
miscellaneous crimes.10 Workers in retail trades, such as conve-
nience stores and eating establishments, are particularly suscepti-
ble since these businesses are generally open all night and often
have few employees.1
Because of the alarming nature of these statistics, pressure is
mounting for employers to take an active role in protecting their
workers.' 2 While employers incurred costs of $4.2 billion in lost
SAN DIEGO Bus. J., Oct. 24, 1994, at 23; Problems Predictable, Employers Can Act to Re-
duce Hazards on the Job, OSHA Official Says, 24 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 16 (June 1,
1994). "The total number of incidents in which workers are attacked but not killed on-the-
job may be anywhere from tens of thousands of incidents to several million, depending upon
how such attacks are defined and recorded ..... Regional, Area OSHA Offices Need Guid-
ance to Address Work-Related Assaults, AFSCME Says, 24 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at
1276 (Nov. 9, 1994) [hereinafter Regional Offices]. Data analyzed from a National Crime
Victimization Survey for 1987-1992 showed each year one million individuals are victims of
violent crime at work. One Million Workers Affected Each Year, New Justice Department
Study Reports, 24 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 387 (July 27, 1994); see also Alex Heard,
Working Stiffs: Keep Your Job, Keep Your Life, NEw REPUBLIC, Aug. 22, 1994, at 11.
8. See Robberies Far Outstrip Other Causes of Work-Related Homicides, Article
Says, 23 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at 1222 (Feb. 16, 1994) [hereinafter Robberies]; see also
Matthew Hall, Grudges Make Workplace Murders Soar, Bus. FIRST OF COLUMBUS, July 4,
1994, at 25; Robert D. Ramsey, Violence on the Job: How Safe is Your Workplace?, SUPER-
VISION, Aug. 1994, at 6.
9. CENSUS, supra note 5, at 3; see also Changing Character, supra note 5 (roughly 1 of
7 victims of workplace homicide was killed by a co-worker); Majority of Violent Workplace
Attacks Caused by Customers, Clients, Report Says, 23 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 616
(Oct. 20, 1993); OSHA Work of Compliance Directive is Nearing Completion, Official Says,
12 Employee Rel. Wkly. (BNA) 957 (Aug. 29, 1994) [hereinafter Compliance Directive]
(workplace homicides primarily committed by members of the public, not co-workers); Re-
gional, supra note 7 (misconception that workplace violence is largely a result of workers
attacking co-workers); Ira A. Lipman, Violence at Work, Bus. PERSPECTIVES, June 22, 1994,
at 14 (externally-generated crime is more prevalent).
10. CENSUS, supra note 5, at 1, 3; see also SCRUTINY, supra note 6; Changing Character,
supra note 5, at 17; Robberies, supra note 8; Lipman, supra note 9, at 15.
11. CENSUS, supra note 5, at 1, 3; see also SCRUTINY, supra note 6; Compliance Direc-
tive, supra note 9; Improved Lighting, Worker Training Urged to Protect Workers from
Workplace Homicide, 23 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 645 (Oct. 27, 1993) [hereinafter
Improved Lighting]; Decline, supra note 6; Orin M. Kurland, Workplace Violence, 40 RISK
MGMT., June 1993, at 76.
12. See Louis P. DiLorenzo & Darren J. Carroll, The Growing Menace: Violence in the
Workplace, 67 N.Y. ST. B.J., Jan. 1995, at 24 (employers under increasing pressure to for-
mulate and implement responses to workplace violence); see also OSHA Should Hold Em-
ployers Accountable for Taking 'Reasonable Measures,' Labor Says, 23 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA)
No. 34, at 1008 (Jan. 26, 1994); Improved Lighting, supra note 11; Lipman, supra note 9, at
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work and legal expenses alone last year due to workplace vio-
lence, 13 the reality is that many employers refuse to acknowledge a
problem exists and will not respond until a tragedy has occurred in
their workplace. 14 The Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-
tration (OSHA) and various state legislatures are beginning to ac-
knowledge this reality and are starting to outline their role in
prompting employers to prevent violence in the workplace. 15 Even
more notable in the crusade to make workplaces safer is the role of
employees and their families who are victims of workplace vio-
lence. An increasing number of them are bringing civil lawsuits
against their employers claiming the employers provided inade-
quate security to guard against criminal attacks at work.16 These
employee lawsuits directly challenge state workers' compensation
15 (the time has come for business to protect the security of its personnel); Shari Caudron,
Fight Crime, Sell Products, INDUSTRY WK., Nov. 7, 1994, at 49, 52 (Americans believe corpo-
rate America should play a role in stemming the tide of violence); Mark Braverman & Susan
R. Braverman, Seeking Solutions to Violence on the Job; The United States of Violence,
USA TODAY, May 1994, at 29, 30 (companies are in best position to make a difference in the
security and quality of life of their workers); Ramsey, supra note 8 (companies should begin
to pay attention to issues of employee safety).
13. Jenny C. McCune, The Age of Rage; Workplace Violence, SMALL Bus. REP., March
1994, at 35 [hereinafter Age of Rage]; see also Jenny C. McCune, Companies Grapple With
Workplace Violence, MGMT. REV., Mar. 1994, at 52, 53-54. The average award in a security
negligence case is $1 million. Alfred G. Haggerty, Employers Need to Address Workplace
Violence, NAT'L UNDERWRITER PROP. & CASUALTY-RISK & BENEFITS MGMT., Sept. 27, 1993,
at 68. Costs of crime in the workplace are also threatening the economic viability of the
nation's small businesses. Crime-Associated Costs Squeezing Small Businesses, House
Panel Told, 24 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 391 (July 27, 1994).
Other costs of workplace violence include security costs, building repair and cleanup,
business interruption with customers, loss of productivity, lost work time, turnover of em-
ployees, increased workers' compensation claims and increased insurance premium rates. S.
ANTHONY BARON, VIOLENCE IN THE WORKPLACE, A PREVENTION & MANAGEMENT GUIDE FOR
BUSINESSES 68-69 (1993); see also Age of Rage, supra, at 35.
14. Group Urges Proactive Steps to Reduce Workplace Violence, 23 O.S.H. Rep.
(BNA) No. 15, at 382 (Sept. 8, 1993); see also Tracey Rosenthal, Despite Increasing Attacks
at Workplaces, Most Companies are not Implementing Safety Measures, Experts Say,
Bus. FIRST OF BUFF. July 25, 1994, at 15; Robert H. Elliott & Deborah T. Jarrett, Violence
in the Workplace: The Role of Human Resource Management, Pun. PERSONNEL MGMT.,
June 22, 1994, at 287; Age of Rage, supra note 13, at 36 ("[C]orporate denial is the biggest
problem."). But see Dale D. Buss, Combating Crime; Small Businesses Take Safety Pre-
cautions, NATION'S Bus., Mar. 1994, at 16, 18 (examples of proactive approaches taken by
some businesses to prevent violence in their workplaces).
15. See infra parts I, II; see also OSHA Looking Into Growing Problem, Agency
Staffer Tells Seminar Attendees, 24 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 973 (Sept. 28, 1994).
16. See Pamela R. Johnson & Julie Indvik, Workplace Violence: An Issue of the Nine-
ties, 23 PuB. PERSONNEL MGMT. 515 (1994); see also Nancy Chambers et al., The Best and
Worst Jobs for Women, WORKING WOMAN, July 1994, at 38, 46; Robert H. Bernstein, Com-
panies Tackle Workplace Violence, N.J. L.J., Apr. 25, 1994, at 10; Lipman, supra note 9, at
16.
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schemes which ordinarily provide an exclusive statutory remedy
for work-related injuries and operate to preclude civil lawsuits
against employers.
Workplace violence is justifiably beginning to capture atten-
tion from the administrative, legislative and judicial bodies of the
nation."' Inevitably, employers will have to play some role in pro-
tecting their workers from the criminal acts of third parties. How
this role should come about is the focus of this Article. The Article
first examines the response of OSHA and various state legislatures
to the growing problem of workplace violence and comments on
their effectiveness in prompting employers to provide safe working
environments. In addition, theories holding an employer liable in
tort or breach of contract for failure to provide a safe workplace to
its employees are analyzed. Since workers' compensation statutes
currently operate to preclude such suits, the Article will discuss
how the courts should play a role in removing workplace violence
cases from the grip of workers' compensation exclusivity provisions
and how the rationale used to hold landlords liable for criminal
attacks upon tenants should be extended to the employer/em-
ployee relationship. The Article also discusses whether employers
will be prompted to take action to protect employees from violence
in the workplace if the courts and legislatures allow these incidents
to remain solely within the purview of workers' compensation. This
Article also analyzes the complex nature of modern commercial re-
lationships including situations where businesses lease property
from landowners and control of the premises is negotiated in the
lease.19 Is it equitable to allow an employee of a business tenant
who becomes a victim of workplace violence to recover in tort
against the landowner and only recover under workers' compensa-
tion against the employer?
Ultimately, the Article concludes that the best way to prompt
employers to take an active role in preventing criminal attacks
upon its employees would be a combination of state legislation and
an altered workers' compensation scheme that would allow a court
to award damages in a tort suit against negligent employers to vic-
17. See generally infra part I.
18. See Strategy to Prevent Occupational Homicide Needs Coordination, Collabora-
tion, NIOSH Says, 22 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 1198 (Nov. 11, 1992) (workplace homi-
cide is a public health problem of significant proportion); see also Braverman & Braverman,
supra note 12, at 29 (workplace violence is an "epidemic" affecting the American
workforce).
19. "Many parties may become legally entangled when work place violence occurs.
These include the property owner, management company, outside security contractor and
tenant." Phillip M. Perry, Assault in the Work Place: How to Cut Your Legal Risk, ETOR
& PUBLISHER Mar. 26, 1994, at 18.
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tims of workplace violence.
I. OSHA's RESPONSE TO WORKPLACE VIOLENCE
Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970 to "assure so far as possible every working man and woman in
the Nation safe and healthful working conditions .... ,20 The Act
places primary responsibility for protecting workers on the shoul-
ders of employers who are charged with both a specific duty to
comply with health and safety standards set forth in the Act 2' as
well as a general duty to provide a safe workplace for all employ-
ees. 22 The requirement to provide a safe workplace is commonly
referred to as the "general duty clause," and was enacted by Con-
gress to cover employment hazards not specifically addressed by a
promulgated safety standard set forth in the Act.2 3
Since the Act currently does not contain a specific standard
addressing workplace violence, agency inspectors are encouraged to
make use of the general duty clause to cite workplaces where there
is a reasonable expectation that violence may occur. 4 Due in part
to increasing pressure from unions and recent federal research on
workplace violence,25 OSHA plans to issue a compliance directive
to assist agency inspectors in enforcing the general duty clause
against employers.2 6 The directive will include items such as a bus-
iness' exterior lighting and training for employees on how to re-
spond to violent incidents in the workplace. OSHA also plans to
issue guidelines to target violence in the night retail and health
20. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1985).
21. Id. § 654 (a)(2).
22. Id. § 654 (a)(1). The general duty clause states that an employer "shall furnish to
each of his employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recog-
nized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his
employees." Id.
23. See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH LAW § 141 (3d ed. 1990);
see also Group Home, Transport Firm Settle Citations; Agree to Measures to Improve
Workers' Safety, 23 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 1566 (Apr. 13, 1994).
24. See Dear Outlines Strategy to Address Issue; Special Assistant Named to Spear-
head Effort, 23 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 33, at 980, 981 (Jan. 19, 1994) [hereinafter Dear
Outlines Strategy]; see also OSHA Considering Developing Guidelines With Input From
Interested Parties, Group Told, 24 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 1193, 1194 (Nov. 2, 1994).
25. Dear Outlines Strategy, supra note 24, at 981; see also Labor Union Calls on
OSHA to Convene Working Group to Tackle "Horrid Scourge," 23 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No.
21, 625 (Oct. 20, 1993); OSHA Should Hold Employers Accountable for Taking "Reasona-
ble Measures," Labor Says, 23 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at 1008 (Jan. 26, 1994).
26. Compliance Directive, supra note 9, at 957.
27. OSHA Looking Into Growing Problem, Agency Staffer Tells Seminar Attendees,
24 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 973 (Sept. 28, 1994); see also Compliance Directive, supra
note 9, at 957.
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care sectors.28 While details are not available at this point, OSHA
notes these guidelines will not carry any enforcement power. 29
While OSHA's measures are encouraging, the issuance of the
guidelines and compliance directive could be the extent of OSHA's
action to ensure employers provide working environments free of
violence. Already, agency officials acknowledge their inability to re-
spond,30 the unlikelihood of a promulgated standard,31 and the
limitations of staff and budget to address the issue.2 Instead,
OSHA appears resigned to tackle the problem by levying "stiff
fines" for violations of the general duty clause and working closely
with employers and employees to ensure workplaces are safe. 3
Without a promulgated standard, the effectiveness of citing an
employer under the general duty clause to ensure worker safety is
minimal. OSHA primarily deals with work-related violence on a
complaint and referral basis, leading to few citations.34 In addition,
preliminary citations issued to employers who violate the general
duty clause because of workplace violence hazards indicate that
penalties are limited, ranging only from $750 to $5000.31 While em-
ployers may report violent deaths in the workplace to OSHA, an
agency official notes that such incidents "will not typically gener-
28. OSHA Says Guidelines Will Target Night Retail and Health Care Sectors, 24
O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at 1729 (Jan. 25, 1995).
29. Id.
30. See Workplace Violence Rule Not Likely, OSHA Official Tells State Legislatures,
23 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 1747 (May 11, 1994) (OSHA is still "not sure how to
respond" and has "little advice to offer states trying to stem violence in the workplace"); see
also Guidelines May Be Focus of OSHA Plan to Fight Violence, Senior Official Says, 24
O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 1396 (Nov. 23, 1994) (combatting workplace violence is not an
"easy issue" for OSHA).
31. See Gregg LaBar, Grand Plans; The Occupational Safety & Health Administra-
tion's Major Programs for 1995, OccuPATIoNAL HAZARDS, Dec. 1994, at 32, 33 (OSHA will
use guidelines and local emphasis programs to deal with workplace violence); see also Work-
place Violence Rule Not Likely, OSHA Official Tells State Legislatures, 23 O.S.H. Rep.
(BNA) No. 49, at 1747 (May 11, 1994) (OSHA has "no intention or desire to promulgate a
standard" to address workplace violence).
32. Job-Related Violence Falls Within OSHA Jurisdiction, Agency Official Says, 24
O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 1055 (Oct. 19, 1994). OSHA officials also note the new politi-
cal climate it is facing and is therefore handling workplace violence issues slowly. OSHA
Says Guidelines Will Target Night Retail and Health Care Sectors, 24 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA)
No. 34, at 1729 (Jan. 25, 1995).
33. Workplace Violence Rule Not Likely, OSHA Official Tells State Legislatures, 23
O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 1747 (May 11, 1994).
34. OSHA Looking Into Growing Problem, Agency Staffer Tells Seminar Attendees,
24 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 51, at 973 (Sept. 28, 1994).
35. Employer Liability, OSHA Criminal Acts, Workplace Violence Discussed at ABA
Meeting, 24 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 624 (Aug. 17, 1994); Psychiatric Hospital in
Chicago Cited by OSHA for Workplace Violence, 23 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 646
(Oct. 27, 1993).
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ate an OSHA inspection."3 6 Additionally, many employers feel that
if they report workplace violence incidents to the police then they
have met their obligation to provide a safe workplace.31 In light of
OSHA's reluctance to promulgate a standard, the unlikelihood of
inspection 8 and the imposition of minimal fines for a violation, it
is unlikely employers will take OSHA seriously enough to assume
an active role in protecting employees from violence in the
workplace.39
II. STATE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO WORKPLACE VIOLENCE
Fear of crime is an increasing concern of the public40 and vio-
lence in the streets and homes is beginning to spill over into the
workplace.41 "It [even] makes us think twice before making a
latenight stop at an empty 7-Eleven. '42 In response to the public's
concern, states are beginning to take action to protect workers
from violent attacks. In 1993, for example, Florida became the first
state to mandate crime prevention measures for convenience
stores.43 This mandate arose following the success of a city ordi-
nance in Gainesville, Florida, which reduced the number of conve-
nience store robberies by eighty percent over a six year period
from 1986 to 1992.44 The city ordinance requires two clerks on
duty between 8:00 p.m. and 4:00 a.m., parking lots with ample
lighting, safes that employees cannot open, a limit of $50 in the
cash register and an unobstructed view into the store.45 The suc-
cess of the ordinance has prompted more than 260 communities
36. OSHA Says Guidelines Will Target Night Retail and Health Care Sectors, 24
O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at 1729 (Jan. 25, 1995).
37. Compliance Directive, supra note 9, at 957.
38. OSHA has a mere 2000 inspectors to seek out potential problems in six million
workplaces. See Thomas J. Sheeran, OSHA Inspection Helped Arcade Company's Plant
Cut Workplace Injuries, BUFF. NEWS, Feb. 18, 1995, at B9.
39. In fact, criminal prosecutions against companies whose employees are injured on
the job are on the rise. This is due in part to OSHA's increasing unresponsiveness in regu-
lating workplace safety. Therefore, prosecutors feel they must take on the responsibility
themselves. Deborah A. Ballam, Intentional Torts in the Workplace: Expanding Employee
Remedies, 25 AM. Bus. L.J. 63, 63 (1987).
40. See Caudron, supra note 12, at 49; Buss, supra note 14, at 16.
41. Social Factors That Can Fuel Violence Include Stress, Family Troubles, Seminar
Told, 23 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 750, 750 (Nov. 10, 1993); Ramsey, supra note 12, at
6; Thomas Dunkel, Newest Danger Zone: Your Office, WORKING WOMAN, Aug. 1994, at 38,
40; Hager, supra note 7, at 23.
42. Caudron, supra note 12, at 49.
43. See Dunkel, supra note 41, at 70; Convenience Business Security Act, 46 FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 812.1701-175 (West 1994).
44. See Buss, supra note 14, at 19.
45. Id.
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nationwide to request copies of the law for conducting their own
studies. 46
California is especially sensitive to workplace violence, as
homicide became the leading cause of job-related deaths for its
workers in 1993.47 Workplace violence killed more workers in Cali-
fornia than any other state, including those with large urban popu-
lations such as New York and Florida.48 California's Occupational
Safety and Health Agency (Cal-OSHA) released new workplace se-
curity guidelines effective August 15, 1994, which underscore the
need for employer involvement to ensure the safety of its employ-
ees.49 Responding to a 31.7% rise in fatal workplace assaults from
the previous year, Cal-OSHA felt the need to use their "statutory
discretion" to "issue any orders necessary to eliminate the causes
and prevent reoccurrences of ... occupational accidents .. .
Unsatisfied with the issuance of the guidelines, the California State
Employees Association is pressing for a bill from the legislature to
force Cal-OSHA to promulgate a standard on workplace violence.51
The Association is also requesting legislation that would levy stiff
fines on government agencies who violate safety and health regula-
tions, and legislation that would repeal a state statute that ex-
empts governmental entities from civil penalties.52
In 1994, California passed two bills seeking to protect state
and private sector employees. First, the Workplace Violence Safety
Act allows employers to obtain temporary restraining orders and
injunctions to protect employees from individuals who are harass-
ing or stalking them."3 The second measure requires the establish-
ment of an interagency task force to develop recommendations for
improving security in office buildings where state employees come
46. Id.
47. Workplace Violence: Facing the Facts, O.S.H. Daily (BNA) (Nov. 29, 1994).
48. California, New York, Texas Lead States in Total Assault-Related Workplace
Fatalities, 23 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at 910 (Jan. 5, 1994).
49. Legislative Agenda; AB 2788, SB 469, SB 1448, SB 1648; Tort Reform; Cal/OSHA
Workplace Guidelines, S. CAL. Bus., Nov. 1994, at 5 [hereinafter Legislative Agenda]. Inter-
estingly, OSHA will base its workplace violence guidelines partly upon Cal-OSHA's work-
place violence guidelines. OSHA Says Guidelines Will Target Night Retail and Health
Care Sectors, 24 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at 1729 (Jan. 25, 1995); see also NACOSH
Group Suggests Steps OSHA, NIOSH Can Follow to Combat Job-Related Incidents, 24
O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 28, at 1510 (Dec. 7, 1994).
50. Legislative Agenda, supra note 49.
51. State Failed to Provide Safe Workplace Following Fatal Shooting, Workers Com-
plain, 23 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at 951 (Jan. 12, 1994).
52. Id.
53. California Governor Signs Two Bills Seeking to Enhance Security on the Job, 24
O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 1031 (Oct. 12, 1994).
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into contact with the public. 4 Also in 1994, a state employee asso-
ciation prompted California's Tax Board to pledge $6.4 million for
security measures at field offices statewide and improved policies
regarding job-related violence.5 5 The Board's action took place fol-
lowing a contract grievance for failure to provide a workplace free
of recognized hazards associated with assault on the job; the recog-
nized hazards being "potentially-dangerous taxpayers."56
New York also suffers from a high rate of workplace homicide.
Nearly fifty percent of all workers fatally injured at work in the
New York metropolitan area are victims of homicide.5 7 "The big-
gest threat to life on the job in New York City is murder."5 " Recog-
nizing a threat to its taxi drivers, New York City requires barriers
between drivers and passengers in taxicabs.59 The Governor of
New York responded to the growing rate of workplace violence by
awarding $5.88 million in grants to spur occupational safety and
health training statewide, some of which will be used to address
violence on the job.6 0 The Long Island Occupational Safety and
Health Administration also organized a local outreach effort to ed-
ucate local businesses on workplace violence, including identifica-
tion of hazards and how to correct them before enforcement ac-
tions occur. 1 Similar to California, New York's Civil Service
Employees Association is taking action to protect its front-line
public employees by urging the State Labor Department to issue a
workplace security standard.62
54. Id.
55. California Agency to Spend $6.4 Million for Workplace Security After Shooting
Death, 23 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 50, at 1800 (May 18, 1994).
56. See California Tax Board Responds to Demands by State Employee Group for
Work Site Security, 24 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 620 (Aug. 17, 1994). A key official of
the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees indicated that organ-
ized labor should use safer workplace conditions as a political issue in 1996. The Republi-
cans' political agenda could put front-line public employees at risk. "When welfare is cut off
and the orphanages start up, they [the people affected] aren't going to be throwing rocks at
Newt Gingrich; they're going to be throwing rocks - or worse - at us." Labor Should Use
Safe Workplace Issues for Political Purposes, Group Told; 1996 Eyed, 24 O.S.H. Rep.
(BNA) No. 28, at 1515 (Dec. 7, 1994).
57. See Buss, supra note 14, at 17.
58. Homicide Major Cause of On-the-Job Death, Federal-State Study Finds for New
York Area, 23 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 876 (Dec. 22, 1993).
59. Problems Predictable, Employers Can Act to Reduce Hazards on the Job, OSHA
Official Says, 24 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 16 (June 1, 1994).
60. Cuomo Awards $5.88 Million for New York Job Safety, Health, (Bus. Publishers)
24 Occupational Health & Safety Letter No. 19 (Oct. 19, 1994).
61. Outreach Project to be Established by Long Island OSHA to Educate Businesses,
24 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 935 (Sept. 14, 1994).
62. Public Workers Union Sees More Violence in Workplace, Urges Standard on Se-
curity, 22 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at 1402 (Jan. 13, 1993).
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As evidenced by the recent activity of OSHA and a handful of
concerned states, workplace violence is no longer just a criminal
justice issue.6 3 While the nation is only beginning to consider legis-
lation to prompt employers to protect workers, the trend is likely
to continue if crime remains a compelling issue confronting the
electorate. Recently, Congress received a request from the House
Small Business Committee for funds to conduct more specific stud-
ies on business-related crime and violence. 4 Private groups are
also beginning to exert influence on legislatures to address work-
place violence. For example, the National Association of Conve-
nience Stores plans to collect twenty-five million signatures on pe-
titions to demand the enactment of truth-in-sentencing laws to
ensure criminals complete their prison terms to protect not only
the public in general, but convenience store workers in particular.6 5
The Association will use the signatures to prompt crime legislation
at the state level when state legislatures reconvene in early 1995.66
While the impact of OSHA's regulation on workplace violence
is yet to be seen, the success of Gainesville's ordinance is notewor-
thy67 and signals that state legislation can be a viable method to
encourage employers to take an affirmative role in protecting their
employees from random violence occurring in the workplace. As
one California assemblywoman stated, "corporate feet need to be
held to the fire .... We certainly don't allow other kinds of work-
ers' safety issues to be handled through volunteerism "6.... 68
III. JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO WORKPLACE VIOLENCE
As the workplace becomes more violent, an increasing number
of victims and their families are bringing contract and negligence
lawsuits against employers for breach of a duty to protect employ-
ees from the criminal acts of third parties. 9 Participation in work-
ers' compensation schemes currently shields most employers from
63. See Job-Related Violence Falls Within OSHA Jurisdiction, Agency Official Says,
24 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 1055 (Oct. 19, 1994).
64. House Small Business Committee Requests Funds for More Research on Business
Crime, 24 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 607 (Aug. 17, 1994).
65. Convenience Store Industry Kicks Off Petition Drive for Stiffer Sentencing, 24
O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 934 (Sept. 14, 1994) [hereinafter Convenience Store]. The
convenience store industry is particularly active in pursuing safe workplaces for its employ-
ees. See Removing Robbery Risk Could Shield Workers From Violence on the Job, Occupa-
tional Health & Safety Letter (Bus. Publishers) (Aug. 22, 1994); Buss, supra note 14.
66. Convenience Store, supra note 65.
67. The success of Gainsville's ordinance has already been referred to in cases involv-
ing workplace violence. See, e.g., Havner v. E-Z Mart Stores, 825 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. 1992).
68. Dunkel, supra note 41, at 70.
69. See Lipman, supra note 9, at 16.
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liability in these civil suits because of the exclusive statutory rem-
edy provided for employees injured in the workplace.70 In the early
twentieth century, civil suits brought by injured workers against
employers were removed from the tort system by workers' compen-
sation laws.7' Under workers' compensation, employees relinquish
their common-law rights in return for timely, scheduled payments
for work-related injuries set forth in the compensation statutes.7 12
This trade-off, or bargain, between the employer and the employee
was ideal when it was first instituted because the prevailing tort
system at the time made it difficult for employees to recover
against employers and workers' compensation provided a quick,
guaranteed recovery.7s
Today, workers question the equity of this bargain in a society
where the modern tort system fosters improved prospects for re-
covery and significantly higher monetary recoveries.7 4 Even though
the workers' compensation system provides a guaranteed recovery,
it frequently serves as an inadequate remedy for certain workplace
injuries, especially those incurred as a result of violence in the
workplace.7 5 Rather than providing full tort compensation for all
70. See, e.g., Stapleton v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 774 F.2d 622 (4th Cir. 1985); Grillo ex rel.
Durham v. National Bank of Washington, 540 A.2d 743 (D.C. 1988); General Motors Accept-
ance Corp. v. David, 632 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Bercaw v. Domino's Pizza,
Inc., 630 N.E.2d 166 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); contra Peavler v. Mitchell & Scott Mach. Co., 638
N.E.2d 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). See also DiLorenzo & Carroll, supra note 12, at 29; HENRY
H. PERRrIT, JR., WORKPLACE ToRTs: RIGHTS & LIABILITIES § 1.28 (1991).
71. See Note, Exceptions to the Exclusive Remedy Requirement of Workers' Compen-
sation Statutes, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1641, 1641 (1983) [hereinafter Exceptions to Workers'
Compensation].
72. Id.; Paul C. Weiler, Workers' Compensation & Product Liability: The Interaction
of a Tort & a Non-Tort Regime, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 825, 826-27 (1989).
73. See Exceptions to Workers' Compensation, supra note 71, at 1641; Weiler, supra
note 72, at 826-27.
74. See Exceptions to Workers' Compensation, supra note 71, at 1644-45 (easier for
employees to recover under tort system today); CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., CASES &
MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 1272 (1993) (one commentator cited a U.S. Chamber of
Commerce Study that reported for a loss of a hand, workers' compensation coverage ranged
from $8,675 to $102,510, but tort recovery for the same loss ranged from $150,000 to
$425,000).
The average cost of a workplace injury covered under workers' compensation is $11,318.
The average cost for a claim involving a shooting is $29,232. Study Reveals Increase in
Claims Involving Intentional Violent Acts, 24 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 1057 (Oct. 19,
1994). In contrast, jury awards for inadequate security cost on average $1.2 million. Settle-
ments out of court reach $600,000. Perry, supra note 19, at 18.
75. Injuries suffered by employees who are victims of violent attacks in the workplace
are many times emotional in nature. For example, rape can subject a victim to long-term
emotional, as well as physical damage. "Rape is a life-altering trauma.... It doesn't just
happen one night and go away the next day or the next week. Victims deal with this on a
daily basis for years and years afterward." Jill Agostino, Why Do They Feel Sorry For the
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economic and noneconomic losses, the typical compensation
scheme only provides medical and rehabilitation costs and approx-
imately two-thirds of net wages. 76 Disability payments are availa-
ble, but only if the employee is physically impaired or if a loss of
earning capacity occurs. 7 Damages for pain and suffering are un-
compensated under the statute and recovery for a worker's spouse
or children is excluded. 78 For these reasons, employees are at-
tempting to elude the exclusivity provisions of the statutes to ob-
tain additional damages in civil suits against employers for injuries
in the workplace. 9
While most courts are reluctant to undermine the traditional
workers' compensation bargain,80 if victims of workplace violence
continue to test the courts, it is possible the judicial system will
consider establishing exceptions to the exclusive remedy limitation
for these incidents.81 Judicially created doctrinal exceptions to the
exclusivity provisions of workers' compensation statutes are not
unheard of. In fact, several courts have already carved out excep-
tions to the exclusivity requirement using a dual capacity doctrine,
intentional tort exceptions, suits by third parties against employers
for contribution and indemnity, and suits against parent and sib-
ling corporations of the employers.8 2 These judicial exceptions seek
to address the inequities that exist because of the juxtaposition of
workers' compensations schemes and the tort system.
83
Culprit Instead of the Victim in Rape? BUFF NEWS, Feb. 12, 1995, at F-9. Death benefits are
also extremely limited under workers' compensation. NICHOLAS A. ASHFORD & CHARLES C.
CALDART, TECHNOLOGY, LAW & THE WORKING ENVIRONMENT 229 (photo. reprint 1995)
(1991). Most states provide 400 to 500 weeks of the average weekly wage for a death in the
workplace. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES & MATERIALS ON TORTS 936 (5th ed. 1990). Workers'
compensation does not provide for emotional distress or pain and suffering. See 1 ARTHUR
LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 2.40 (1990). In contrast, under the com-
mon law goal of full compensation, a tort recovery is not limited. Therefore, a victim who
brings a cause of action in tort can recover substantial damages for emotional distress and
pain and suffering. See EPSTEIN, supra, at 935; PERRITr, JR., supra note 70, § 2.33.
76. Exceptions to Workers' Compensation, supra note 71, at 1642.
77. See Weiler, supra note 72, at 826; EPSTEIN, supra note 75, at 935.
78. See LARSON, supra note 75, § 2.40; SULLIVAN ET. AL., supra note 74, at 1272.
79. Ballam, supra note 39, at 64.
80. Exceptions to Workers' Compensation, supra note 71, at 1654.
81. Id. at 1648; see, e.g., Peavler v. Mitchell & Scott Mach. Co., 638 N.E.2d 879 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1994). Courts are already questioning the employers' role in protecting workers
from potentially violent co-workers. See Employer Liability Seen Growing for Potential
Hazards Posed by Employees, 23 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 1287 (Feb. 23, 1994) (courts
may start to look at who is responsible; this inquiry is based on trends for the employer and
landlord to address safety problems).
82. Exceptions to Workers' Compensation, supra note 71, at 1648.
83. Id. at 1660-61.
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[T]he creation of the four exceptions ... contributes to the achievement of
compensation and efficiency goals. Each exception identifies a class of cases
in which the exclusive remedy rule ought not to bar additional tort dam-
ages. . . . [T]he exceptions reap the efficiency advantages of imposing a
greater share of accident costs on employers.8 4
For example, absent a judicial exception to entertain indemnity
suits against employers, a third party whom an injured employee
can recover against in full, whose responsibility may have been
minimal compared with that of the employer, would be liable for
the full amount of damages. As a result, the employer would es-
cape all liability.8 5
The existence of judicial exceptions to the exclusive remedy of
workers' compensation also demonstrates an attempt by the courts
to correct the divergent recoveries available to employees under
the two systems.86 Notably, the extension of the strict product lia-
bility doctrine beyond consumer products to workplace products,
which allowed workers to sue third-party manufacturers for inju-
ries suffered in the workplace from defective machinery, resolved
the inequity of a tort recovery available to a consumer and a lim-
ited workers' compensation recovery to an employee for an injury
received from the same tool.8 7
Since judicially created exceptions are aimed at specific ineq-
uities, one inequity courts might consider in workplace violence
situations is the fact that a business patron injured during a store
robbery is afforded a tort claim against the business, 88 yet an em-
ployee injured in the same robbery would be limited to workers'
compensation coverage. In addition, many injuries suffered by em-
ployees subject to violent attacks in the workplace are emotional,
not physical, therefore affording little, if any, recompense under
workers' compensation. For example, a rape, which causes exten-
sive emotional damage, but may not cause any lasting physical in-
jury, would be compensated significantly less under a workers'
compensation scheme than an assault where an employee is beaten
and sustains physical injuries even though both acts are equally
heinous. Not only would a judicial exception created for workplace
violence situations alleviate these inequities, increase the amount
of compensation available, and transfer the true cost of the injury
84. Id. at 1652.
85. Id. at 1651.
86. Id. at 1652.
87. Id.
88. Perry, supra note 19, at 18 (workers' compensation does not shield employers when
violent crime occurring in the workplace injures clients or independent contractors); see,
e.g., Cohen v. Southland Corp., 203 Cal. Rptr. 572 (Ct. App. 1984).
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to the employer,89 but such an exception would draw attention to
the need for legislative action.90
While courts tend to defer to the workers' compensation "bar-
gain" originally set forth by the legislature,91 "courts can legiti-
mately interpret the exclusive remedy rule in light of modern cir-
cumstances and goals."92 As one federal court of appeals judge
stated when confronted with a negligence action against an em-
ployer for a 2:00 a.m. robbery and rape of one of its clerks,
"[p]rinciples of law pushed to their extremes frequently find them-
selves at war with one another. Their mutual accommodation, so
that they may live, if in tension, nevertheless, at peace with one
another, becomes the responsibility of the courts. s9 3 It is not ap-
propriate for a court to strictly adhere to statutory language and
legislative purpose when it is clear that the legislature was not con-
fronting the issue of violence in the workplace, a recent develop-
ment in modern society.9 4
It is wrong to view the compensation system as a static bargain impervious
to societal change.... [W]orkers would be bound by the strictures of the
compensation system until legislatures roused themselves sufficiently to en-
act reform.... [T]he bargain must be recalibrated to reflect the changes in
the realities of the tort system and the workplace that have made the...
trade off unacceptable. Courts ... applying workers' compensation statutes
can accomplish.., this adjustment by... not merely assuming tort reme-
89. The payment of workers' compensation to employees injured by workplace violence
does not fall upon the employer. Instead, it falls on the public because compensation premi-
ums are considered a business operation expense and therefore employers incorporate pre-
miums into product prices, which are paid for by consumers. See Ballam, supra note 39, at
77, 90-91; ASHFORD & CALDART, supra note 75, at 228. If employers are responsible for pay-
ing typical tort damages, which are viewed at common law as the true measure of full com-
pensation to the victim, it will be difficult to pass these costs on to the consumer because it
would require charging higher prices than competitors. Not only would this force the em-
ployer to bear the true costs of doing business, but paying tort damages would also serve as
an incentive to protect employees. Ballam, supra note 39, at 90; cf. ASHFORD & CALDART,
supra note 75, at 9 (workers' compensation has made the cost of accidents more predictable,
therefore employers lost their economic incentive to avoid accidents); ASHFORD & CALDART,
supra note 75, at 234-35 (workers' compensation and tort system should be modified so
employers bear the 'external' costs of doing business).
90. Exceptions to Workers' Compensation, supra note 71, at 1653. Legislatures do re-
spond to judicial opinions which request legislative action. See Exceptions to Workers'
Compensation, supra note 71, at 1659; see, e.g., Pamela B. v. Hayden, 31 Cal. Rptr. 147, 161
(Ct. App. 1994) (stating the legislature should take on the daunting task of imposing ra-
tional limits on landlord liability for criminal acts of third parties).
91. Exceptions to Workers' Compensation, supra note 71, at 1661; see, e.g., Grillo ex
rel. Durham v. National Bank of Washington, 540 A.2d 743, 754 (D.C. 1988).
92. Exceptions to Workers' Compensation, supra note 71, at 1654-55.
93. Stapleton v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 774 F.2d 622, 622 (4th Cir. 1985).
94. See Exceptions to Workers' Compensation, supra note 71, at 1656-57.
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dies are precluded.95
IV. VICTIMS' RIGHTS LITIGATION AND THE KLINE DECISION
"Society's need to deter crime is spurring a new trend in tort
liability. . . . '[V]ictims' rights litigation' is establishing legal du-
ties" that were nonexistent thirty-five years ago. 8 Liability is im-
posed under a theory that a crime was committed against a partic-
ular victim as a result of the breach of a third party's duty to
protect.97 Victims are now enjoying significant success in suits
against these third parties despite the intervening acts of
criminals. 98 Accompanying the success of these suits is the fact
that courts are paying less attention to victim compensation pro-
vided under insurance contracts, restitution and state-funded com-
pensation programs.99 This trend suggests that courts are increas-
ingly finding justifications in the law to hold third parties liable
when violent attacks are involved, regardless of whether victims
obtain compensation elsewhere.
Some employers feel they have no duty to protect their em-
ployees from the criminal acts of third parties, including the pay-
ment of workers' compensation. In Jesse v. Savings Products,100
the employer and its insurance company appealed an award of
workers' compensation benefits for chronic post-traumatic stress
syndrome suffered by a convenience store clerk who was raped by
a customer while working alone during a late night shift.10 1 First,
the employer argued that there was no employment-related motive
on the part of the assailant because he took no money or other
property from the store.102 The assailant succeeded only in com-
mitting a rape, which alone suggested a personal motive. 0 3 Second,
the employer argued that the plaintiff received no significant phys-
ical injury and that any mental disability incurred by the clerk was
95. Id.
96. See Gregory A. Crouse, Negligence Liability for the Criminal Acts of Another, 15
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 459, 459-60 (1982). "Victims' rights litigation" is a term adopted by
modern commentators that refers to cases where a victim brings a civil suit against a crimi-
nal or negligent third party whose act allegedly caused an injury. Id. at 459 n.4.
97. Id. at 461.
98. Id. at 462.
99. Id.
100. 772 S.W.2d 425 (Tenn. 1989).
101. Id. at 426.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 427. However, the employer overlooked the fact that the police arrived
during the attack and were able to apprehend the assailant. Id. at 426.
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a result of past problems in her life, not a result of the rape."'
Similarly, twenty-five years ago landlords also argued that
they had no duty to protect their tenants from the criminal attacks
of third parties. 105 However, successful victims' rights litigation
succeeded in imposing liability on some landlords for violent at-
tacks on their tenants.106 In 1970, the traditional immunity af-
forded landlords, although different in nature from the immunity
provided employers through workers' compensation, was elimi-
nated with a decision from the District of Columbia Circuit in
Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp.0 7
A. The Kline Decision: The Downfall of Traditional Immunity
Afforded Landlords for Criminal Attacks upon Tenants
In the past, as a general rule, a landlord had no duty to pro-
tect tenants from third party criminal attacks.'08 Courts recognized
this rule in landlord-tenant law because of their reluctance to in-
trude on the landlord-tenant relationship, the intervening act of
the criminal, the difficulty of determining foreseeability of criminal
acts, the vagueness of a standard the landlord would have to meet,
economic consequences of the imposition of a duty and the respon-
sibility of law enforcement officials in the public sector to provide
protection. 09 However, beginning in 1970 with the landmark Kline
case, courts started to recognize the realities of modern day urban
apartment living and were forced to reevaluate landlords' responsi-
bilities with respect to the safety of tenants from third party crimi-
nal acts." 0
In Kline, the court held a landlord liable for injuries suffered
when a criminal assaulted and robbed a tenant in a common hall-
way of an apartment building."' Liability in tort founded upon a
breach of a duty to protect the tenant existed for two reasons.
First, the landlord had an implied obligation, arising from the con-
tractual relationship with the tenant, to provide "those protective
104. Id. at 426.
105. See James L. Weiss, Comment, Landlord Liability - Obligation to Maintain Ade-
quate Security - A Comparative Study, 59 TuL. L. REV. 701, 701 (1985).
106. See Crouse, supra note 96, at 461.
107. 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970); see also Weiss, supra note 105, at 704; Crouse,
supra note 96, at 469.
108. See Crouse, supra note 96, at 469; see also B.A. Glesner, Landlords as Cops: Tort,
Nuisance & Forfeiture Standards Imposing Liability on Landlords for Crime on the Prem-
ises, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 679, 685 (1992).
109. Kline, 439 F.2d at 481.
110. Irma W. Merrill, Note, Landlord Liability for Crimes Committed by Third Parties
Against Tenants on the Premises, 38 VAND. L. REV. 431, 434 (1985).
111. Kline, 439 F.2d at 478.
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measures which are within his reasonable capacity. 11 2 Second, a
criminal attack upon the tenant was foreseeable because of the
landlord's knowledge of repeated criminal activities on the prem-
ises.l1s The court also emphasized the landlord's control over the
common areas1 1 4 of the building and his superior economic position
which made him better equipped to guard against the risk of
harm.115 The court noted that the landlord's control exceeded even
that of the police, who could not patrol entryways and garages of
apartment buildings, and also the control of tenants, who were un-
able to secure common areas."6 While the landlord is not an "in-
surer of his tenant's safety," he has "obligations to aid in law en-
forcement and to minimize opportunities for crime. 11, 7
In the aftermath of Kline, many courts have begun to hold
landlords who fail to provide adequate security liable for criminal
attacks on their tenants," 8 a liability that landlords did not envi-
sion would materialize. Many employers today feel as landlords did
twenty-five years ago. Yet, the judiciary or legislature could revive
the reasoning set forth in Kline to justify an imposition of a duty
upon an employer to protect its employees from the criminal acts
of third parties. To establish liability against landlords, injured te-
nants advance several theories, some of which could be equally via-
ble in the employment context. For example, victims of workplace
violence can bring contract and tort actions against employers
based on breach of an express or implied contract, a voluntary as-
sumption to provide security, or ordinary negligence.
112. Id. at 485. The standard of care to be met in Kline included the degree of security
that existed when the lease was signed. Id. at 486. The notion first set forth in Kline that a
landlord has an implied contractual obligation to maintain the security that existed at the
lease's inception was never implemented in any court, but instead the implied obligation
took the form of an implied warranty of habitability. See Weiss, supra note 105, at 705.
Using a theory of an implied warranty of habitability to find liability for criminal attacks of
third parties is argued as imposing a strict liability standard upon a landlord. See Merrill,
supra note 110, at 446.
113. Kline, 439 F.2d at 483. The landlord in Kline had actual and constructive notice
that the building was experiencing a "rising wave of crime.... [Therefore] the landlord here
'was aware of conditions which created a likelihood'.. . that further criminal attacks upon
tenants would occur." Id.
114. Id. at 481.
115. See id.
116. Id. at 480, 484.
117. Id. at 484.
118. Weiss, supra note 105, at 701.
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V. LEGAL THEORIES TO UTILIZE IN A CIVIL SUIT AGAINST AN
EMPLOYER TO IMPOSE LIABILITY FOR CRIMES IN THE WORKPLACE
A. Breach of Express or Implied Contract
The existence of an express or implied contractual duty to
protect an individual from a criminal attack is much easier to ap-
ply in the landlord context than it is in the employment context.
Most landlords enter into leases with their tenants, the lease being
the contract giving rise to the express or implied duty."9 Existence
of a contract in the employment context is much more difficult to
establish. Many people in the workforce today are "at-will" em-
ployees with no written employment contracts.2 0 However, cases
such as Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc.2 ' and Foley v. Inter-
active Data Corp., 22 indicate that contractual obligations can arise
between an employer and employee absent a formal written con-
tract. As a result of these holdings, employers' express statements,
handbooks and manuals can create enforceable implied-in-fact em-
ployment contracts.
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Woolley concluded:
[W]hen an employer of a substantial number of employees circulates a man-
ual that, when fairly read, provides that certain benefits are an incident of
the employment ... the judiciary, instead of "grudgingly" conceding the
enforceability of those provisions . . . should construe them in accordance
with the reasonable expectations of the employees .... 123
... The manual is an offer that seeks the formation of a unilateral
contract - the employees' bargained-for action needed to make the offer
binding being their continued work when they have no obligation to
continue. 12'
In Foley, the California Supreme Court held that the company's
own conduct and personnel policies could give rise to an enforcea-
ble oral contract with its employees. 25 While recognizing a threat
to the traditional "at-will" relationship of the parties,'26 the court
119. See Glesner, supra note 108, at 698; see also Kline, 439 F.2d at 485; Flood v.
Wisconsin Real Estate Inv. Trust, 503 F. Supp. 1157, 1160 (D. Kan. 1980).
120. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 74, at 8 n.13.
121. 491 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1985) (holding that implicit contract limited employer's abil-
ity to fire an employee for other than cause despite the fact that the employment was termi-
nable at will).
122. 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988) (holding that statute of frauds did not bar an action for
breach of an oral or implied contract that could be performed within one year).
123. Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1264.
124. Id. at 1267.
125. Foley, 765 P.2d at 387-88.
126. See id. at 387.
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found "no sound reason to exempt the employment relationship
from the ordinary rules of contract interpretation which permit
proof of implied terms."'12 7 The statute of frauds did not negate the
oral agreement because contract performance was possible within
one year.128 For instance, the employee could quit or be terminated
during this one year period.
If a contract exists expressing an employer's intention to pro-
vide a "safe" working environment, an employee/victim of work-
place violence could bring an action against an employer not only
for breach of contract, but also for breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing implied in most contracts.129 Under such a
theory, in order for employees to function on the job and perform
their bargained for exchange, it is the employer's duty to provide a
safe workplace for the employees. Some courts today recognize an
urban apartment lease as an exchange of rent for a "well known
package of goods and services," which includes reasonable security
protection as part of that expected package.130 The same can be
said about the employer/employee bargain. The employee ex-
changes services in return for a package which includes wages and
a reasonably safe place to work.' 3 '
One victim attempted to bring a tort claim against an em-
ployer in Williams v. Munford, Inc.. s2 The plaintiff in this case
was an eighteen-year-old convenience store clerk raped by a crimi-
nal in the course of a store robbery at 4:00 a.m. 33 The store was
located in a high crime area of Mississippi and had a history of
frequent robberies during which other clerks were injured. 34 De-
spite the prior incidents, the employer did not implement security
measures. 3 5 The clerk had no key to lock the doors and was not
permitted to keep a weapon.3 " In addition to a negligence claim,
the plaintiff advanced the theory that her employer breached a
127. Id.
128. Id. at 383 ("It has been repeatedly held that, if an agreement ... may be com-
pletely performed within one year ...it is not within the statute of frauds.") (citations
omitted).
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). Section 205 states that every
contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance
and enforcement. Id.
130. Merrill, supra note 110, at 448 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
131. Even though crime rates continue to rise, employees still expect their workplaces
to be safe. Paul Holley, For Employers, Answers to Workplace Violence Prove Elusive, Bus.
J. MILWAUKEE, Oct. 1, 1994, at 1.
132. 683 F.2d 938 (5th Cir. 1982).
133. Id. at 938.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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contractual duty to provide her with a safe workplace.1l 7 This
breach, in light of the employer's knowledge of prior incidents and
failure to implement any security measures, constituted an action
so callous and reckless as to amount to an intentional tort, thus
escaping the exclusivity of a workers' compensation remedy.138 The
Fifth Circuit concluded that Mississippi courts have labeled this
type of action as an "endrun" around the workers' compensation
system and have held them to be contrary to the "spirit and phi-
losophy of the Workmen's Compensation Act."'' 39
In another case seven years later, Tabor v. Munford, Inc.,"4" a
nineteen-year-old clerk working alone in a Michigan convenience
store was murdered during a nighttime criminal attack. M  Her es-
tate claimed the employer breached its contract to provide safe
working conditions to the decedent. 42 The court dismissed the
claim stating that the plaintiffs attached a breach of contract label
to what was essentially a negligence claim. 43 Relying on an earlier
Michigan Supreme Court decision, Beauchamp v. Dow Chemical
Co.,' the court held the "all-inclusive character of the exclusive-
ness principle [of workers' compensation] results in barring actions
for covered injuries even though the plaintiff casts his action in the
form of a breach of some kind of contract.' 1 45
Even if breach of contract claims could escape workers' com-
pensation exclusivity provisions, prevailing under a breach of con-
tract theory would not be very effective in encouraging employers
to take an active role in protecting their employees because liabil-
ity would be limited to the facts of each case. Employer liability
for breach of a contractual promise to protect would depend on the
existence of an employment contract, including any written and
oral exchanges between the employer and employee, the degree of
security existing in other similar establishments, and the types of
security existing at the time the employment contract came into
existence. Not only would these cases require additional resources
such as time and attorney fees, but the limitation on damages in
contract actions would leave employers merely paying for items
that a workers' compensation scheme requires them to pay. Dam-
137. Id. at 940.
138. See id.
139. Id. (quoting Brown v. Estess, 374 So. 2d 241, 242-43 (Miss. 1979)).
140. No. G86-132 CA5, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10785 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 17, 1989).
141. Id. at *1.
142. Id. at *4.
143. Id. at *6.
144. 398 N.W.2d 882 (Mich. 1986) (citations omitted), superseded by statute, MICH.
Comp. LAws. § 418.131 (1987).
145. Id. at 894.
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ages allowed in contract actions, including breach of the implied
duty of good faith and fair dealing,146 are limited to economic
losses such as property or personal injury.147 Contract remedies do
not include punitive damages and compensation for pain and suf-
fering.148 In addition, employers will still have control over the de-
cision to implement security measures based on what, if any, oral
or written statements they make to employees. While advocates of
a free market system would argue that employees can bargain for
security, the current job market is not conducive to individual em-
ployee demands that security provisions be incorporated into
working relationships. 49 Employers are relatively free to refuse
such demands without suffering harm because they can easily re-
place employees facing workplace violence, who very often are low-
wage, semi-skilled workers. °50 In addition, relatively quick em-
ployee turnover rates and isolated working conditions do not facili-
tate powerful, organized movements that could prompt employers
to provide safer working environments.
B. Voluntary Assumption of a Duty to Protect
Under a voluntary assumption theory, an employer's duty to
protect employees from the criminal acts of third parties arises
from the employer's express or implied promise to provide secur-
ity.15 ' The issue under this theory is not whether a duty to protect
on the part of an employer exists, but whether the employer actu-
ally assumed the duty. 52 If an employer is found to have assumed
a duty to protect, he is bound to exercise that duty with reasonable
care. If he does not, liability can be imposed if harm results. Sec-
tion 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts declares:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third
person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical
harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his
undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk
of such harm, or (b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other
146. See PERRITr, supra note 70, § 1.18; see, e.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765
P.2d 373, 374 (Cal. 1988).
147. See Glesner, supra note 108, at 698 n.88.
148. See id.
149. See generally ASHFORD & CALDART, supra note 75, at 226-31 (arguing that many
workers are willing to tolerate a high level of workplace risk rather than jeopardize job
security).
150. See id. at 243.
151. See Glesner, supra note 108, at 695.
152. See id. at 696.
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to the third person, or (c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the
other or the third person upon the undertaking.153
Assumption of a duty to protect exists where employers con-
tract to provide security, or where they actually implement secur-
ity measures. In Vaughn v. Granite City Steel Division of Na-
tional Steel Corp.,154 for example, the Illinois appellate court
found an employer's duty to protect existed based on a voluntary
contractual undertaking to protect the employee while he was on
the premises. 155 In Vaughn, the decedent/employee was a victim of
a latenight homicide in his employer's parking lot shortly before he
was to begin work.156 A jury returned a $415,000 verdict against
the employer after the employee's estate brought an action under
the state's wrongful death statute,57 which required a finding of a
duty on the part of the employer to protect the decedent. 158 Ap-
pealing the judgment of the trial court, the employer argued that
its motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be
granted because the company owed no "legally cognizable duty" to
the decedent.'59 However, the appellate court declared that the
duty issue was "decided without difficulty" because of the em-
ployer's voluntary undertaking.8 0
The court in Vaughn turned to a company-issued manual en-
titled "Standard Operating Procedures, Plant Protection Depart-
ment" to determine that the employer did indeed assume the duty
to protect the decedent."6 ' Statements in the manual such as, "[t]o
maintain the peace and protect all employeees and their property
while they are on the Company's premises," made it clear the em-
ployer intended to protect its employees. 62 Other statements re-
flected a duty to keep strangers off the premises and provide a se-
curity force to perform its duties: "[t]o deny access to all persons
not specifically authorized or properly invited," and "[t]o provide a
readily available, trained, and responsive force to function in
emergencies."1 63
153. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 324A (1965).
154. 576 N.E.2d 874 (IlM. App. Ct. 1991).
155. Id. at 878.
156. Id. at 876.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 877.
159. Id. at 878.
160. Id. Vaughn's estate urged that a duty existed based on a special employer/em-
ployee relationship, the foreseeability of the criminal act and the company's voluntary con-
tractual undertaking to protect the decedent. Id. at 877.
161. Id. at 879.
162. Id. at 879-80.
163. Id. at 879.
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Martin v. McDonald's Corp."" is another case where a court
utilized a voluntary assumption theory to create a duty on the part
of a defendant to protect employees. In Martin, a six-woman teen-
age crew was working to clean up and close a McDonald's restau-
rant in Illinois when an armed robber appeared in the back of the
restaurant.' While forcing the crew into the refrigerator, the rob-
ber shot and killed one teen and assaulted two others."6" The trial
court awarded $1,003,445 in damages for the wrongful death of the
girl the robber killed and $125,000 for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress to each of the girls the robber assaulted. 6 7 McDon-
ald's appealed the damage awards stating they owed no duty to
protect the victims because it was merely the licensor of the busi-
ness."68 The appellate court rejected the argument and found that
the corporation owed a duty of care and protection because it had
voluntarily assumed the duty to protect employees of its licen-
sees. 6 9 The Illinois appellate court justified its use of the voluntary
assumption theory to impose liability because the state supreme
court had used the same theory to impose liability in two Illinois
landlord-tenant cases. 70
The Martin court found that McDonald's had assumed an in-
creased responsibilty for care and protection of its franchisors' em-
ployees because it had created a separate corporate branch to deal
with security problems and had prepared a "bible" for store secur-
ity operations.' 7 ' The corporation also had a regional security man-
ager who checked on restaurant security problems, contacted indi-
vidual restaurant managers regarding security policies, and was
obligated to "follow-up" to ensure problems were handled and that
security procedures were followed. 2 While the restaurant manager
where the attack occurred was never given the security procedures
manual, the regional security manager from McDonald's did in-
form the manager regarding proper closing procedures, which in-
cluded instructions not to use the back door after dark.17 3 Realiz-
ing the importance of prohibiting entry after dark through the rear
of the restaurant, the regional security manager also ordered a se-
curity window and new alarm system for the back door prior to the
164. 572 N.E.2d 1073 (IlM. App. Ct. 1991).
165. Id. at 1076.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1075-76.
168. Id. at 1076.
169. Id. at 1078.
170. Id. at 1076.
171. Id. at 1077.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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attack. 17 4
Since the court found the corporation had assumed this duty,
the corporation was responsible for performing it with due care
and competence. 175 The court held that the corporation did not
perform its duty with due care because the regional security man-
ager never followed-up to ensure the crew's proper implementation
of security procedures. 76 Furthermore, testimony revealed that
most of the employees were not informed with regard to the use of
the back door after dark and that employees had moved the dump-
ster close to the back door to facilitate the disposal of garbage. 17 7
McDonald's requested that they be "afforded the protection
given in section 5(a) of the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act,"
which would limit the employees to the exclusive remedy provided
for under the Act. 78 The Martin court agreed with the jury's de-
termination that the individual restaurant manager/licensee was
an agent of the corporation/licensor. Therefore the store manager's
negligence for not communicating safety procedures to his employ-
ees was attributable to the corporation.' 9 Despite the fact that res-
taurant manager was an agent of the corporation, and the corpora-
tion was responsible for his negligent act, this did not make
McDonald's the restaurant manager's employer.8 0 Therefore, the
court found the workers' compensation could not be utilized to
protect McDonald's from the civil suit brought by the franchisee's
employees."8'
The theory of a voluntary assumption of a duty to protect is
an important one in modern society because employers often lease
their property from a commercial landlord.'82 Depending on the
terms of the lease, the commercial lessor and/or employer/lessee,
could be liable for the same violent act against an employee of the
employer/lessee. For example, in Rowe v. State Bank of Lom-
bard,18 3 a masked intruder gained access to a commercial office
park and accosted two female employees working from midnight to
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1078.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1080.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Many parties become entangled in a negligent security lawsuit when a business
owner leases property from a commercial landlord. See Perry, supra note 19, at 18; Johnson
& Indvik, supra note 16, at 518.
183. 531 N.E.2d 1358 (Ill. 1988).
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8:00 a.m., seriously injuring one and killing the other.'8 4 The plain-
tiffs initially brought separate actions for personal injury and neg-
ligence under wrongful death and probate statutes, but the actions
were consolidated by the trial court. 85 The actions were against,
inter alia, the employer/tenant, the park owner/lessor, and the les-
sor's managing agent.'86 The trial court denied the employer's mo-
tion for summary judgment, but granted summary judgment to the
lessor and the lessor's agent.18 7 The appellate court affirmed the
grant of summary judgment to the lessor and agent, but the Illi-
nois Supreme Court reversed, stating there was a triable issue of
fact as to whether the lessor and agent owed a duty to the business
tenant's employees. 88
In reversing the grant of summary judgment to the lessor and
agent, the Illinois Supreme Court discussed voluntary undertaking,
making three statements of particular importance. First, in the
lease, the lessor specifically disclaimed responsibility for protecting
tenants from criminal acts on the premises, therefore negating any
intent to assume a duty to protect. 8 ' Second, while the landlord
agreed to provide illumination in common areas, such action is
"commonplace" and cannot be reasonably regarded as an assump-
tion of a duty to deter criminal attacks. 90 Third, a mere investiga-
tion by the lessor's agent in response to a call that an intruder was
on the premises cannot create a duty to protect.'9 '
Imposing a voluntary duty upon employers to protect employ-
ees under an assumption theory could be very productive in the
employment context if employees were given oral assurances, or
found written statements in company handbooks that demon-
strated that an employer intended to provide a safe workplace.
However, utilizing the theory to prompt employers to implement
security measures for the protection of their employees would not
be recommended. It is uncertain what actions or statements on the
part of an employer would be fairly viewed as a true assumption of
a duty to protect the employee. As seen from Rowe, lights and
doorlocks are common incidents to maintaining property and do
not rise to an assumption of any duty. Would an assumption occur
then only if the employer provided security measures that are
184. Rowe v. State Bank of Lombard, 505 N.E.2d 1380, 1382 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 531 N.E.2d 1358 (IlM. 1988).
185. Id. at 1381-82.
186. Id. at 1382.
187. Id. at 1383.
188. Rowe v. State Bank of Lombard, 531 N.E.2d 1358, 1370 (Ill. 1988).
189. Id. at 1365.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1365-66.
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unique or extraordinary, such as a security system or guards?9"
Because it is unclear when a voluntary assumption begins, fear of
liability could deter an employer from implementing any security
measures at all. While an employer has an incentive to install se-
curity measures to protect business property, therefore protecting
its investment, the incentive is minimized when the security mea-
sures act to expose an employer to potential civil liability for inju-
ries to its employees. 193
C. Negligence
Courts are generally reluctant to hold an individual responsi-
ble for the intentional criminal acts of third parties. 94 However,
the doctrine of ordinary negligence has played a major role in im-
posing liability upon landlords for criminal attacks on their te-
nants. 95 The elements of a negligence action include the existence
of a duty, a breach of that duty and damages proximately resulting
from the breach. 9 Negligent conduct can be an affirmative act
that creates an unreasonable risk of harm to another or a failure to
act which is negligent only if there is a duty to act.197 When a court
is asked to consider whether a duty exists on the part of an indi-
vidual to protect another from foreseeable criminal activity, the
nature of criminal acts in modern society becomes particularly
troublesome.
[T]he law ordinarily does not require the prudent person to expect the
criminal activity of others.
Since duty is essentially a recognition of an obligation imposed as a
response to human experience, a conflict has arisen due to the significant
increase in crime .... [M]odern living has revealed that there are situations
where criminal activity can be predicted with a significant degree of
probability. Simultaneously .... occurrence of crime is still so unpredictable
198
The unpredictable nature of crime makes it generally reasonable
for an individual to risk the possibility of a criminal act without
192. One commentator notes a voluntary duty requiring a landlord to provide adequate
security to prevent attacks upon tenants would be "vague, inefficient, inequitable, and
counterproductive." Rex A. Sharp, Paying for the Crimes of Others? Landowner Liability
for Crimes on the Premises, 29 S. TEx. L. REv. 11, 50 (1987).
193. Glesner, supra note 108, at 699.
194. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRTs § 33, at 201
(5th ed. 1984).
195. See Glesner, supra note 108, at 702.
196. KEETON ET AL., supra note 194, § 30, at 164-65.
197. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 284 (1965).
198. Crouse, supra note 96, at 465.
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taking preventative measures because the continual burden of
those measures outweigh the apparent risk. °9 In addition, a duty
to protect is seen as an exception to the general rule that a person
has no duty to protect another from criminal acts. 200 A person's
general duty to protect all individuals from crime would be unreal-
istic, not only because of the cost,201 Therefore, courts turn to spe-
20320cial relationships, special circumstances,0 4 such as when an indi-
vidual exposes another to an unreasonable risk of crime, or
statutes205 to find an exception to the general rule.
While victims of workplace violence are attempting to create
exceptions to the rule that an employer has no duty to protect
them from random workplace violence, it is already recognized
that "[iun the employment context, the major hurdle typically is in
finding the existence of any duty at all. ''20$
1. Duty Created by Special Relationship. An employer could
have a duty to protect employees from criminal attacks based on
the recognition of a "special relationship" between the employer
and employee. A special relationship is recognized by a court when
an individual has a special responsibility to protect the victim or if
the individual creates a temptation for criminal acts that requires
him to protect against foreseeable criminal activity.07 The Re-
statement Second of Torts states that special relationships exist,
giving rise to a duty to protect between common carriers and pas-
sengers, innkeepers and guests, possessors of land and the invited
public, and jailers and inmates. 0 The duty is created in these re-
lationships based on the superior control of one of the parties to
perceive and protect the other from the risk of a criminal attack.2 0 9
Until recently, a special relationship giving rise to a duty on
the part of a landlord to protect his tenants never received much
credence from the courts,210 even though Kline enunciated that the
modern landlord/tenant relationship is analogous to that of the
199. KEETON ET AL., supra note 194, § 33, at 203.
200. Crouse, supra note 96, at 465.
201. Id..
202. Id. at 467 (declaring the difficulties of imposing a duty when fifty people might fail
to rescue one).
203. See infra part VI.C.1.
204. See infra part VI.C.2.
205. See infra part VI.C.3.
206. PERRIrr, supra note 70, § 2.22, at 46.
207. KEETON ET AL., supra note 194, § 33, at 202.
208. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 302B cmt. e, 314(a), 315, 320 (1965).
209. Id. § 320; see Crouse, supra note 96, at 468.
210. See Glesner, supra note 108, at 703 (citations omitted).
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traditional innkeeper/guest.211 However, an increasing number of
jurisdictions are moving toward a recognition of this analogy and
subsequent imposition of a duty existing in the law through a spe-
cial landlord/tenant relationship.212 If a special relationship can be
found between a landlord and a tenant giving rise to a duty to
protect, a special relationship can also be justified between an em-
ployer and employee.
In Lilie v. Thompson,s1 3 the Supreme Court recognized that a
special relationship could exist between an employer and an em-
ployee giving rise to a duty of care.21 4 In Lilie, the employer re-
quired a twenty-two year old operator to work alone, overnight in
an isolated, small building located in a railroad yard.215 The rail-
road yard had inadequate lighting, no guard service, and the build-
ing had no windows that would allow the woman to see who was
knocking on the door.216 Her job entailed the collection and dis-
semination of messages to passing train operators who stopped by
the building.217 One night she opened the door, assuming the visi-
tor to be a train operator, and was subsequently beaten and per-
manently injured by a man bearing a tire iron.2 18 The petitioner
alleged, "[the employer] was aware of conditions which created a
likelihood that a young woman performing the duties required of
[her] would suffer just such an injury as was in fact inflicted upon
her. '219 The employer had a duty to make reasonable provisions to
prevent the danger it was aware of, regardless of whether the dan-
ger was from criminal misconduct, and a breach of that duty would
constitute negligence.220
The notion of a special relationship existing between an em-
ployer and employee has been rejected in the state of Alabama. In
Parham v. Taylor,2 21 an armed robber entered a liquor store
shortly after 10:00 p.m. and shot the store clerk.222 The employee
attempted to recover against her employer based on negligence in
failing to provide a safe workplace, workers' compensation cover-
211. Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 485 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
212. Glesner, supra note 108, at 703.
213. 332 U.S. 459 (1947).
214. Id.; see also Sharp, supra note 192, at 27 n.62; Kline, 439 F.2d at 483; contra
Parham v. Taylor, 402 So. 2d 884, 886 (Ala. 1981).
215. Lillie, 332 U.S. at 460.
216. Id. at 461.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 461-62.
220. Id. at 462.
221. 402 So. 2d 884 (Ala. 1981).
222. Id. at 885.
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age and breach of an employment contract.22 The trial judge
granted summary judgment to the employer on all three counts.224
The employee appealed the negligence claim and the Alabama Su-
preme Court affirmed, concluding that the employer was not liable
as a matter of law.225 The court felt that employers should not be
saddled with civil liability to employees for criminal attacks of
third parties except in the "most extraordinary and highly unusual
circumstances. 2 2 6
In spite of police protection afforded by the state it is a fact of life that
citizens are sometimes assaulted, beaten, robbed, raped or murdered at
home, at work or on the streets. This is a problem which confronts all citi-
zens equally and for which there is often no civil remedy. 2 7
While the court went on to distinguish bank tellers and all-night
attendants as occupations which entail a substantial risk of expo-
sure to criminal acts, it stated that liability should not attach un-
less the employer "greatly and unreasonably increased [the] risk
without taking reasonable precautions for the safety of the em-
ployee .... [I]t is clear that the defenses of contributory negligence
and assumption of risk are available when appropriate. 22 8
2. Duty Created by Special Circumstances: The Role of
Foreseeability. Even if a special relationship is not found to exist
between an employer and employee, thereby negating a duty to
protect as a matter of law, the court can employ policy justifica-
tions in order to justify the imposition of a duty.229 As Dean Pros-
ser stated, "it should be recognized that 'duty' is not sacrosanct in
itself, but is only an expression of the sum total of those considera-
tions of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is enti-
tled to protection." 30 Therefore, courts look to special circum-
stances to create a duty to protect, such as foreseeability of harm
to the plaintiff, certainty of the plaintiff's injury, closeness of the
connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suf-
fered by the plaintiff, moral blame, policy of preventing future in-
jury, burden on the defendant, consequences to the community of
imposing the duty, and the availability, cost, and existence of in-
223. Id.
224. Id. at 885-86.
225. Id. at 887.
226. Id. at 886.
227. Id. (quoting Thoni Oil Magic Benzol Gas Stations, Inc. v. Johnson, 488 S.W.2d
355, 357 (Ky. 1972)).
228. Id. at 886-87.
229. See Crouse, supra note 96, at 470-71; see also Sharp, supra note 192, at 21.
230. KEETON ET AL., supra note 194, § 53, at 358.
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surance to cover the risk.2 31
Foreseeability of crime appears to be the primary considera-
tion2 3 2 with regard to the question of duty in workplace violence
cases, and its consideration is both crucial233 and controversial. 234
The existence of a legal duty of care is a question of law to be
determined only by the court,235 while foreseeability is ordinarily a
question of fact for the jury, and is decided as a question of law
only if there is no room for a reasonable difference of opinion.23 6
Since foreseeability is a factor the court considers when deciding if
a duty exists under a special circumstances approach, the role fore-
seeability plays for the court and the jury must be distinguished.
Foreseeability in a duty context is limited to an evaluation of
"whether the category of negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently
likely to result in the kind of harm experienced that liability may
appropriately be imposed on the negligent party. '23 7 Essentially,
the court measures a duty by the scope of the risk that the negli-
gent conduct foreseeably entails. 38 "Thus, the court determines
whether the risk of harm was reasonably foreseeable, charting out
the areas of liability and exchlding the remote and unexpected. ' 239
This role is contrasted with the "fact-specific foreseeability ques-
tions bearing on negligence (breach of duty) and proximate causa-
tion posed to the jury or trier of fact. ' 240 Under the jury's proxi-
mate cause inquiry, a determination is made of whether the
particular harm was foreseeable, i.e., likely enough to follow from
the defendant's negligence to justify holding him responsible.
Since the existence of a duty as a matter of law is essential to
any negligence action, what the court considers as evidence of fore-
seeability of a particular type of harm to the victim is crucial. In
cases involving violent attacks, courts use a prior similar incidents
rule or a totality of the circumstances test to evaluate the evidence
of foreseeability. 241 Under a prior similar incidents rule the court
231. Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 212 n.5 (Cal. 1993).
232. See, e.g., Cohen v. Southland Corp., 203 Cal. Rptr. 572, 576 (Ct. App. 1984);
Gomez v. Ticor, 193 Cal. Rptr. 600, 603 (Ct. App. 1983); Graham v. M & J Corp., 424 A.2d
103, 105 (D.C. 1980).
233. See, e.g., Ann M., 863 P.2d at 214; Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 695 P.2d
653, 657 (Cal. 1985); Lopez v. McDonald's, 238 Cal. Rptr. 436, 443 n.6 (Ct. App. 1987).
234. See Sharp, supra note 192, at 23.
235. KEETON LT AL., supra note 194, § 37, at 236.
236. Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 665 P.2d 947, 950 (Cal. 1983) (citations omitted).
237. Lopez, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 443 (quoting Ballard v. Uribe, 715 P.2d 624, 629 n.6 (Cal.
1986)).
238. Id. (citations omitted).
239. Id. at 444 (citations omitted).
240. Id. at 443 (citations omitted).
241. See Sharp, supra note 192, at 64.
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considers the proximity, time, number and types (i.e., burglary,
rape) of prior violent incidents and then determines if the particu-
lar harm befalling the plaintiff was foreseeable in light of these
prior acts. 42 Under a totality of the circumstances test, the court is
allowed to consider not only past criminal acts, but also the nature
of the business, the condition of the premises and the surrounding
neighborhood. 4 3 Many courts have turned to a totality of the cir-
cumstances test 244 for several reasons, outlined most clearly in the
California Supreme Court decision of Isaacs v. Huntington Memo-
rial Hospital.245
In Isaacs, a doctor was shot in the chest by an assailant in a
hospital parking lot after he left the hospital around 10:00 p.m. 24 6
Dr. Isaacs and his wife alleged that the hospital failed to provide
adequate security measures to protect him against the criminal
acts of third parties on the premises. 247 At trial, evidence was
presented showing that the hospital was located in a high crime
area, several threats to individual safety had occurred in the emer-
gency room area across from the parking lot, and thefts had oc-
curred in the surrounding area.248 Additional testimony revealed
that emergency room facilities and their surrounding areas are in-
herently dangerous, and that parking lots by their very nature give
rise to a special temptation and opportunity for criminal con-
duct.249 The trial court granted the hospital its motion for a non-
suit claiming, inter alia, the plaintiffs failed to produce evidence of
prior similar incidents and the reasonable foreseeability of the
shooting.250 The Isaacs appealed, and the California Supreme
Court reversed, stating the trial court erred as a matter of law in
determining that the doctor's assault was not foreseeable. 2 1 Re-
jecting a recent line of court of appeals cases requiring proof of
prior similar incidents before a duty could be imposed upon land-
owners to anticipate criminal activities of third parties, the court
242. Id. at 65-68.
243. Id. at 64-65; see, e.g., Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 695 P.2d 653, 661
(Cal. 1985); Doe v. Dominion Bank of Washington, N.A., 963 F.2d 1552, 1560 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (the District of Columbia uses a combination of factors analysis, which is similar to a
totality of the circumstances test).
244. See Sharp, supra note 192, at 64.
245. 695 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1985).
246. Id. at 655.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 661-62.
250. Id. at 657.
251. Id. at 662.
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instead adopted a totality of the circumstances test.25 2
Supporting its conclusion, the court noted four fatal flaws in
the rigid prior incidents rule. First, application of the rule was con-
trary to public policy because it meant a landowner would get one
'free' assault before being held liable and would discourage the im-
plementation of preventative measures.5 3 Second, the court noted
the arbitrariness of the rule. How similar did the incidents have to
be?25 4 "[H]ow close in time do the prior incidents have to be? How
near in location must they be? '255 The courts could not apply this
type of rule consistently in ruling on foreseeability. 256 Third, it was
not appropriate to conclude that because a prior incident was not
similar enough in nature, foreseeability should be precluded 257 (i.e.,
burglary versus murder). Finally, the prior similar incidents rule
improperly removed the question of foreseeability from the jury's
consideration. 258 "Foreseeability of harm should ordinarily be de-
termined by a jury. That determination calls for the consideration
of what is reasonable in light of all the circumstances. "259
The Isaacs court viewed the totality of the circumstances, in-
cluding the high crime area, the dangerous nature of the emer-
gency room and parking lot, and other prior incidents of crime and
concluded that the foreseeability of the assault in the parking lot
should have been submitted to the jury.2 0 The court also consid-
ered that the foreseeability of the attack was increased because the
parking lot created a temptation and opportunity for criminal ac-
tivity.261 Referring to a similar case, Gomez v. Ticor,262 the court
noted that "[t]he deserted, labyrinthine nature of [parking com-
plexes], especially at night, makes them likely places for robbers
and rapists to lie in wait. '28 3 Foreseeability "is not to be measured
by what is more probable than not, but includes whatever is likely
enough in the setting of modern life that a reasonably thoughtful
person would take account of it in guiding practical conduct. '2 4
252. Id. at 658, 661; see also Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 214
(Cal. 1993).
253. Isaacs, 695 P.2d at 658.
254. Id. at 659.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 658-59.
257. Id. at 659.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 665.
260. Id. at 661-62.
261. Id. at 662 (citations omitted).
262. 193 Cal. Rptr. 600 (Ct. App. 1983).
263. Isaacs, 695 P.2d at 660 (quoting Gomez, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 604).
264. Gomez, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 604 (quoting Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 665 P.2d
947, 952 (Cal. 1983)).
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Since parking complexes are a modern concept,265 the evaluation of
the foreseeability of such a crime in one of these structures is left
to a jury.2"' A court should not impose its own judgment upon a
situation where reasonable minds could differ.
287
Although California courts concede that the question of duty
is decided by the court and not the jury, 8 including foreseeability
as part of the determination of duty under a totality of the circum-
stances test makes it less likely a court will conclude as a matter of
law that no duty exists. The California Supreme Court has held
that foreseeability should not be removed from the jury and can
only be decided as a question of law when under the undisputed
facts there is no room for a reasonable difference of opinion.260
When a totality of the circumstances test is employed, more fac-
tors are considered in determining foreseeability of crime. There-
fore it is more likely that reasonable minds could differ on the is-
sue. Logically then, when a totality of the circumstances test is
used by a court, summary judgments are more readily precluded.
The court usually cannot find as a matter of law that the defend-
ant owed no duty to protect the plaintiff when foreseeability is in-
volved in the question of duty.
265. Id. Convenience stores are also modern fixtures, therefore requiring a jury to de-
termine if a criminal act occurring in one is foreseeable. Cohen v. Southland Corp., 203 Cal.
Rptr. 572, 578 (Ct. App. 1984).
266. Gomez, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
267. Isaacs, 695 P.2d at 662 (citations omitted).
268. See Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 212 (Cal. 1993) (cita-
tions omitted).
269. Isaacs, 695 P.2d at 659 (citations omitted).
270. The implication of the totality of the circumstances test involving third party
criminal attacks has caused appelate courts to overrule lower court decisions when finding
they erred in concluding as a matter of law that the plaintiff's assault was not foreseeable,
and therefore did not give rise to a legal duty. See, e.g., Small v. McKennan Hosp., 403
N.W.2d 410 (S.D. 1987) (jury should decide if abduction, rape and murder of a woman in a
dimly lit parking garage in an unsafe neighborhood was foreseeable); Graham v. M & J
Corp., 424 A.2d 103 (D.C. 1980) (high crime neighborhood, malfunctioning outer door latch
and previous burglary attempt must be considered in foreseeability of fire set in building
hallway); Cohen v. Southland Corp., 203 Cal. Rptr. 572 (Ct. App. 1984) (previous store rob-
beries and other frequent nighttime robberies of area stores should have been considered as
to foreseeability of injury to customer shot during armed robbery of convenience store);
Gomez v. Ticor, 193 Cal. Rptr. 600 (Ct. App. 1983) (need to consider high crime character of
neighborhood and instances of theft and vandalism to determine if robbery and murder of
victim in parking lot was foreseeable); Kwaitkowski v. Superior Trading Co., 176 Cal. Rptr.
494 (Ct. App. 1981) (need to consider faulty front door lock, easy access to building by
strangers, neighborhood, and prior assault and robbery to determine foreseeability of the
attack assault, battery, rape and robbery of woman in dimly lit lobby of an apartment
building).
The totality of the circumstances test has been effective in precluding summary judg-
ments. It almost appears that duty becomes a question of fact reserved for a jury. In Ann
VIOLENCE IN THE WORKPLACE
The California Supreme Court recently revisited the totality
of the circumstances test set forth by Isaacs in Ann M. v. Pacific
Plaza Shopping Center. 1 In this case, the employee of a business
tenant was raped at approximately 8:00 a.m. when she was working
alone in a photo processing store located in a secluded area of a
shopping center.1 2 The store was equipped with a drop gate to
prevent customers from getting behind the counter, but it was bro-
ken at the time of the incident. A man entering the store got be-
hind the counter, threatened her with a knife, raped her, robbed
the store and fled.21 3 Prior to this incident, various tenants and
employees had voiced complaints about transients who loitered in
the common areas of the shopping center. 274 As a result of loitering
directly outside the photo store, which employees found threaten-
ing, the plaintiff's employer granted permission to the clerk work-
ing overnight to bring her dog to work for protection.276 In re-
sponse to the complaints, a merchants' association hired a security
company to drive by three or four times a day, but foot patrols
were not utilized, as was recommended by a security consultant.27 6
After the rape, the victimized employee filed a complaint for
damages alleging, inter alia, that her employer, the shopping
center owner, and the shopping center's management company
were negligent in failing to provide adequate security to protect
her from an unreasonable risk of harm. 277 The claim against the
employer was dismissed because of the exclusivity provision of the
workers' compensation statute.2 1  The shopping center filed a
cross-complaint for indemnity against the employer, but the court
eventually dismissed the employer without prejudice. 279 Therefore,
only the issue of landowner liability was before the court, not the
issue of employer/tenant liability for the attack on the liability.2 80
In discussing whether the shopping center had a duty as a
M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Ctr., the California Supreme Court rejected the totality of the
circumstances rule adopted by the court in Isaacs, which led to this conclusion. "[B]road
language used in Isaacs has tended to confuse duty analysis generally in that the opinion
can be read to hold that foreseeability in the context of determining a duty is normally a
question of fact reserved for the jury .... Any such reading of Isaacs is in error." Ann M.,
863 P.2d at 207, 215.
271. 863 P.2d 207 (Cal. 1993).
272. Id. at 209-10.
273. Id. at 210.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 210-11.
278. Id. at 210 n.4.
279. Id.
280. Id.
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matter of law to protect the business tenant's employee, the court
stated that while the injured employee was not the tenant, in a
commercial context where a tenant is usually not a natural person,
a duty to protect extends to employees of the tenants who act on
behalf of the business."' Therefore, the lack of a direct landlord/
tenant relationship could not preclude the existence of a duty of
care for landlords in California to take reasonable steps to secure
the common areas.282 In addition, the fact that the rape occurred
inside the tenant's premises was not dispositive because the claim
stated it was the shopping center's failure to adequately maintain
the common areas that caused her injury, and because the plaza
had exclusive control of the common areas under the lease.283
Revisiting the totality of the circumstances test enunciated in
Isaacs to evaluate the duty, the court felt the need to refine the
test.
Unfortunately, random, violent crime is endemic in today's society. It is dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to envision any locale open to the public where the
occurrence of violent crime seems improbable. Upon further reflection and
in light of the increase in violent crime, refinement of the rule enunciated in
Isaacs ... is required.28 4
The court stated that the scope of the duty is determined by bal-
ancing the foreseeability of the criminal acts against the burden of
the duty to be imposed.28 ' In cases where the burden of preventing
future harm is great, a high degree of probability of harm would be
required.ss Where there are strong policy reasons to prevent the
harm, or the harm can be prevented by simple means, a lesser de-
gree of probability would be required.281 In Ann M., the court con-
cluded that for the scope of a landowner's duty to include hiring
security guards, there would have to be a high degree of foresee-
ability, including prior similar incidents, because of the significant
monetary and social costs of imposing the duty.288 "To hold other-
wise would be to impose an unfair burden upon landlords and, in
effect, would force landlords to become the insurers of public
safety .... 29
281. Id. at 212-13.
282. Id. at 213.
283. Id.; but see, e.g., Williams v. Detroit, 339 N.W.2d 215 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983)
(would not extend landlord duty to incidents within the boundaries of leased premises).
284. Ann M., 863 P.2d at 215.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 215-16.
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The Ann M. court, however, did not consider whether the
scope of a landlord's duty of care would include providing security
guards in certain types of commercial property that are inherently
dangerous, like all-night convenience stores or parking garages, in
the absence of any prior similar incidents.2 90 This consideration
could be determinative of the existence of a duty because next to
foreseeability, the second most important factor under the totality
of the circumstances test is whether the "premises attracts or pro-
motes crime." '291 Upset with the majority's decision in Ann M., the
dissent criticized the court for "resurrect[ing] an improper [prior
similar incidents] test discarded by this court eight years ago" and
stated that liability issues and any burden on landowners are fac-
tual matters for a jury to decide, not the court by summary
judgment.292
The District of Columbia Circuit also decided a case, Doe v.
Dominion Bank of Washington, N.A.,29s where the employee of a
business tenant brought a negligence suit against the commercial
landlord claiming it had a duty of care to protect her from the
criminal conduct of third parties. 2 4 In Doe, a secretary working for
a business tenant of the commercial landlord was raped during the
workday in an unlocked office on a vacant floor of the building.2 5
She was in an elevator heading to the lobby when it stopped on a
vacant floor, and a man entered the elevator. 296 The man pro-
ceeded to choke her and drag her down a hallway through un-
locked doors into a dark vacant office where she was raped and
robbed.297 Many of the building's floors were vacant in anticipation
of its sale and the owner had failed to secure the vacant floors
which remained accessible by elevator or stairwell.2 98 During the
month prior to the attack on the plaintiff, many tenants allerted
the landlord regarding threats to their safety, including thefts,
drugs, restroom sexual activity and the presence of intruders.299
The landlord's management company strongly urged the landlord
to take immediate security measures in response to the
complaints. 00
290. Id. at 216 n.8.
291. See Sharp, supra note 192, at 68.
292. Ann M., 863 P.2d at 218.
293. 963 F.2d 1552 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
294. Id. at 1553.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 1555.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 1555-56.
300. Id. at 1557.
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The District of Columbia Circuit noted that in Washington,
D.C., residential landlords have a duty of care to protect those on
the premises from foreseeable criminal activity occurring in com-
mon areas within their control. Because the court could find no
distinction between commercial and residential landlords, the
court found commercial landlords are held to the same duty of
care as residential landlords to protect their tenants.30 1 To deter-
mine whether a duty existed in this case on the part of the land-
lord to protect the plaintiff, the court was compelled to apply a
"combination of factors" analysis, which included foreseeability of
3021 hcrime and the condition of the premises. While the district court
stated the plaintiff's case was "fatally flawed" by the lack of evi-
dence of crimes against persons occurring in or around the build-
ing, the circuit court rejected this reasoning.30 3 In fact, it found the
district court's insistence on evidence of crimes against persons,
versus property, "at odds with D.C.'s multi-factored, anti-talis-
manic approach to foreseeability. '30 4 Therefore, in light of the
building's deficient security, unsecured vacant floors, prior inci-
dents of theft, drug use and sexual activity, and tenant complaints
of intruders, the court found the evidence created an issue on
which reasonable people could differ, thereby precluding judgment
as a matter of law.30 5
Similarly, the Illinois Supreme Court in Rowe v. State Bank of
Lombard30 6 concluded that the distinction between crimes against
property and crimes against the person was not relevant when de-
termining if the attack on two women working overnight in the
office park was within the scope of foreseeable risk,07 therefore
giving rise to a duty on the part of the park owner and manager to
protect the business tenants' employees. The park owner and man-
ager failed to adequately control the distribution and return of
master keys, and the purpose of having secure locks was to prevent
unauthorized entry by intruders s.3 0  Although most of the prior
criminal activity in the office park involved crimes against property
interests, the court acknowledged that these types of crimes "also
involve[ ] a high risk of personal injury or death if the intruder is
confronted."309 Therefore, since the office park manager was aware
301. Id. at 1559-60.
302. Id. at 1562.
303. Id. at 1561.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 1562.
306. 531 N.E.2d 1358 (Ill. 1988).
307. Id. at 1369.
308. Id.
309. Id.
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that employees of its tenants would be working late at night, and
that they would be vulnerable to attack if an intruder was inter-
rupted, the fact that "no violent crimes had been committed at the
office park [did] not render the criminal [activity] unforeseeable as
a matter of law." 310
The Rowe court, combining its foreseeability analysis with
other factors, including the likelihood of injury, the burden to
guard against the injury and the consequences of imposing the
burden on the owner, concluded that there was a triable issue of
fact as to whether the imposition of a duty was justified. 11 Provid-
ing adequate security measures would have been relatively inex-
pensive because the locks could have been "rekeyed" at a cost of
about $2,500 and the tenants could have been notified of the possi-
ble danger. 12 This was not an unreasonable burden for the park
owner and manager to assume. 13 Therefore, the Illinois Supreme
Court held that the appellate court erred in granting summary
judgment to the park owner and manager.3 14 While the Rowe court
included the cost of prevention in its analysis,1 5 the cost element
of providing protection to the plaintiff was never considered. 6
When a court uses a totality of the circumstances test, the role
of foreseeability in the duty analysis appears to preclude the issu-
ance of summary judgments.3 17 In Lopez v. McDonald's,318 how-
ever, the California Court of Appeals held that the defendant owed
no duty, as a matter of law, to the victims of a criminal assault
even though the court used a totality of the circumstances test to
evaluate foreseeability. In Lopez, a man entered a McDonald's res-
taurant in camouflage pants, armed with a semi-automatic rifle
and began indiscriminately slaughtering customers and employees
behind a glass-enclosed structure.31 9 Before he was killed by a
sharp shooter, he succeeded in killing twenty-one people and injur-
ing eleven others.32 0 Despite the restaurant's location in a high
310. Id.
311. Id. at 1369-70.
312. Id. at 1370.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Doe v. Dominion Bank of Washington, N.A., 963 F.2d 1552, 1564 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(Williams, J., concurring).
317. See case cited supra note 270. But see, e.g., Lopez v. McDonald's, 238 Cal. Rptr.
436 (Ct. App. 1987); Gregorian v. National Convenience Stores, Inc., 220 Cal. Rptr. 302 (Ct.
App. 1985).
318. Lopez, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 436.
319. Id. at 438.
320. Id.
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crime area, the rise of gang activity, armed robberies on the prem-
ises, violent criminal assaults in the vicinity, and employee re-
quests for a private security force, the restaurant declined a $5.75
per hour uniformed security service for economic reasons.3 21 Other
businesses in the vicinity had security ranging from armed guards
to closed circuit television systems to roving security patrols.32 2
The court concluded that McDonald's owed no duty as a matter of
law to the victims of the massacre:
[T]he likelihood of this unprecendented murderous assault was so remote
and unexpected that, as a matter of law, the general character of McDon-
ald's nonfeasance did not facilitate its happening. . . . [The] deranged and
motiveless attack . . . is so unlikely to occur within the setting of modern
life that a reasonably prudent business enterprise would not consider its
occurrence in attempting to satisfy its general obligation to protect [em-
ployees] . . . from reasonably foreseeable criminal conduct.
[N]ot only was [his] crime not theft-related, but the narrow focus
on slaughter and [his] obvious suicidal motive are unrelated to the area's
general crime rate as a matter of law.32 3
In addition to foreseeability, the court applied other factors to
conclude a duty did not exist as a matter of law. The court noted
the difficulty of proving a causal nexus because (1) additional se-
curity measures would not likely deter this type of criminal activ-
ity, (2) the lack of moral blame within the context of this type of
harm, and (3) the burden on the defendant to protect against
heavily armed, suicidal murderers was substantial, even though the
policy of preventing future harm was great.3 24 The court also
stated that a fast food restaurant did not create an "especial temp-
tation and opportunity" for this type of criminal conduct.3 25 How-
ever, this fact appears insignificant because in Gregorian v. Na-
tional Convenience Store,326 another California court noted that
although an all-night convenience store can expect its establish-
ment to be the target of armed robberies, a gang attack on the
store resulting in the plaintiff's injuries was the result of an "ex-
traordinary malicious criminal act" that the store owner could not
have anticipated.32 7 Therefore, even though the owner conducted a
business that may have attracted criminal activity, it owed no duty
321. Id. at 438-39.
322. Id. at 440.
323. Id. at 445.
324. Id. at 446-47.
325. Id. at 446.
326. 220 Cal. Rptr. 302 (Ct. App. 1985).
327. Id. at 305-06.
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as a matter of law to protect the injured plaintiff. 28
If courts use foreseeability as the sole or primary factor in cre-
ating a duty for an individual to protect another from criminal at-
tacks, then employers and commercial landowners will not know
when a duty arises to protect employees from criminal attack. Not
only is the concept of foreseeability difficult to define and subject
to varying court interpretations, 29 but in modern society criminal
activity is an everyday occurrence and is often foreseeable. In
many instances the question of duty is actually passed on to the
jury, especially when a totality of the circumstances approach is
taken to evaluate foreseeability, because a court cannot conclude
as a matter of law that a particular injury was not foreseeable.330
The court's foreseeability analysis to determine whether a duty ex-
ists then becomes confused and intertwined with the jury's factual
foreseeability analysis to find proximate cause.
Since it is firmly established that the existence of a duty is a
matter of law to be determined by a court, foreseeability should be
measured carefully by a court before a negligence suit is allowed to
proceed based on a duty owed to the victim. However, foreseeabil-
ity is often disregarded by courts and becomes only a question of
fact for the jury because foreseeability of crime in modern society
is an issue upon which reasonable minds could differ.3 3 ' Foresee-
ability as a duty determinant then becomes a game of chance for
the employer and/or landowner since it will be determined on a
case-by-case basis by a jury, leading to inconsistencies in the crea-
tion of duties to protect.
3. Duty by Statute. In some instances of landlord liability
for criminal acts against tenants, the courts turn to statutes or or-
dinances, instead of special relationships or circumstances, to de-
termine that a duty to protect exists.33 2 In these instances, it is a
state legislature that determines whether a duty exists to protect
others. Courts, therefore, generally feel comfortable using a viola-
tion of a statute as a basis for a negligence action .333 Examples of
statutes that provide for a landlord to maintain a safe premise in-
clude housing codes and the Uniform Residential Landlord Tenant
Act.3 34 While courts feel comfortable using statutory duties as a
328. Id.
329. See XEETON ET AL., supra note 194, § 43, at 297; Crouse, supra note 96, at 471.
330. See case cited supra note 270.
331. See Sharp, supra note 192, at 62.
332. See Glesner, supra note 108, at 702.
333. Glesner, supra note 108, at 699-700; Sharp, supra note 192, at 29.
334. Glesner, supra note 108, at 700.
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basis of a negligence action, many cases in landlord/tenant law in-
dicate that provisions relating to healthy and safe premises only
refer to such things as structural defects and unsanitary condi-
tions, not safety from the criminal acts of third parties.335
However, Florida, which does not generally impose a duty to
protect upon landlords, found in Paterson v. Deeb 33 6 that a land-
lord duty arose from the express language of a state statute which
required leased property to be secured with locks and common ar-
eas to be kept in a safe condition. 37 In Paterson, the apartment
building in which a tenant was raped had defective locks.388 The
court also noted the use of the statute eliminated the foreseeability
requirement when deciding whether a duty to protect existed. The
court, citing Isaacs, was "not willing to ... sacrifice the first vic-
tim's right to safety upon the altar of foreseeability by slavishly
adhering to the now-discredited notion that at least one criminal
assault must have occurred.M3 9
Establishing a duty by statute in the employment context
could be done today, even without specific state statutes address-
ing workplaces prone to violence, if courts acknowledge a statutory
duty to protect employees under OSHA's general duty clause.3 40
The importance of the obligation created under the Act's general
duty clause cannot be overstated.3 41 Congress was clear in its in-
tention that because employers control the conditions of employ-
ment, it is their responsibility to protect workers.3 42
It is firmly established that a private cause of action may not be based
solely on OSHA....
*.. It is much more common for the plaintiff or defendant to seek to
introduce applicable OSHA standards to prove the duty owed to the plain-
tiff by the defendant. As a general proposition, an administrative regulation
may be admitted into evidence to prove the standard of conduct of a rea-
sonable person.3 43
If a statutory duty under OSHA is acknowledged, the court would
then have to determine if noncompliance with an OSHA require-
ment was negligence per se, some evidence of negligence or not ad-
335. Id.
336. 472 So.2d 1210 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
337. Id. at 1218-19.
338. Id. at 1217.
339. Id. at 1218-19.
340. 29 U.S.C. § 654 (a)(1) (1985).
341. ASHFORD & CALDART, supra note 75, at 179.
342. Id. at 88.
343. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 23, § 513, at 500-01.
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missible at all."4' Courts would probably take noncompliance with
a comprehensive workplace violence standard promulgated by
OSHA more seriously than they would a compliance directive.
OSHA standards are supported by extensive research and a
guarded administrative procedure. which ensures input from the
electorate,345 and therefore are truly reflective of the expectations
of society and the law of an employer's role in preventing work-
place violence.
Even though OSHA could be recognized as giving rise to an
employer's statutory duty in a negligence suit to provide work-
places free from violence, workers' compensation remains a consid-
eration. While some plaintiffs have alleged that an employer's fail-
ure to comply with OSHA requirements destroys the immunity
provided by workers' compensation, this reasoning has not been
upheld. 46 Section 4(b)(4) of the Act provides that "[n]othing in
this Act shall be construed to supersede or in any manner affect
any workmen's compensation law or to enlarge or diminish or af-
fect in any manner the common law or statutory rights, duties, or
liabilities of employers and employees .... ,,8 However, and more
importantly, noncompliance with OSHA requirements can be used
to establish willful or intentional misconduct, therefore allowing
escape from the exclusivity of workers' compensation. 4 Employers
are bound to OSHA requirements for workplace safety3 49 and
OSHA's administrative response could be the key for courts to find
an exception to the exclusivity provision of workers' compensation.
If a directive, or more significantly, a standard, is put forth requir-
ing employers to institute certain security measures specifically to
prevent criminal attacks on employees, an employer's disregard of
the requirements could be interpreted as an intentional tort, there-
fore escaping the exclusivity of workers' compensation. 5 °
Having a duty based on a statute, ordinance or regulation
would be ideal because courts feel comfortable applying such a
duty. Employers and landowners would be more aware that such a
duty existed and therefore be more likely to comply with the duty.
A comprehensive statute or regulation could also outline the stan-
dard of care to be applied when performing a duty to protect. In
344. Id. § 513, at 502-04.
345. See ASHFORD & CALDART, supra note 75, at 60, 91.
346. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 23, § 501, at 479 (citations omitted).
347. 29 U.S.C. § 653 (1985).
348. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 23, §§ 501, 505, at 480, 483-85.
349. See ASHFORD & CALDART, supra note 75, at 58.
350. See PERRiTr, supra note 70, at 27 (workers' compensation generally will not pre-
empt intentional tort cause of action).
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fact, one commentator notes that statutory duty cases in landlord/
tenant law may be indicative of a "growing trend of legislative di-
rection in the security of leased premises."35' Lawmakers looking
at how to approach the difficult and evolving area of law involving
liability for workplace violence should heed any trend coming from
courts, who have been grappling for twenty-five years with the is-
sue of landlord liability for criminal attacks upon tenants.
While only a few states today actually have statutes address-
ing businesses prone to workplace violence,5 2 other states consid-
ering the promulgation of statutes or regulations designed to pre-
vent violence in the workplace could provide specific, predictable
requirements tailored to a particular community or type of busi-
ness and could provide for a "first line of defense" against criminal
attacks in the workplace. Their existence would also eliminate the
unpredictable nature and controversial role of foreseeability of
crime in determining whether a duty to protect actually exists.
VI. CAUSATION IN WORKPLACE VIOLENCE CASES
Allowing a negligence suit to proceed against an employer
based on a duty to take reasonable precautions to guard employees
from the foreseeable criminal attacks of third parties would not
necessarily make the employer an insurer of employee safety be-
cause causation must still be proved. Causation requires some rea-
sonable connection between the defendant's act or omission and
the plaintiff's injury.3 53 The connection is ordinarily referred to by
courts as "proximate cause" or "legal cause. 35 4 As Prosser and
Keeton note on the issue of proximate cause, "[t]here is perhaps
nothing in the entire field of law which has called forth more disa-
greement, or upon which the opinions are in such a welter of con-
fusion."3 55 Proximate cause functions to limit a defendant's liabil-
ity to those acts or omissions which are so closely connected with
the resulting injury that the imposition of liability is justified.356 If
proximate cause was not a factor in negligence suits, liability would
exist for all wrongful acts.357
Causation consists of two elements, namely, cause in fact and
proximate cause.3 58 Cause in fact is a particularly difficult concept
351. Glesner, supra note 108, at 702.
352. See infra part H.
353. KEETON ET AL., supra note 194, § 41, at 263.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id. at 264.
357. Id.
358. Id. §§ 41-45.
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because the traditional test for determining if it exists is to have
the fact finder compare the fact of the injury with what would
have occurred if hypothetical, contrary-to-fact conditions had ex-
isted.359 For example, if an employer did not have a security sys-
tem at the time a clerk was killed by an intruder, would the same
assault have occurred even if the employer had a functioning se-
curity system? An act or omission is not viewed as a cause in fact if
the particular injury would have occurred without it.360 In the ex-
ample, if the intruder would have succeeded in killing the clerk,
even if a security system existed, then the absence of the security
system would not be a cause in fact of the injury. The problem in
workplace violence cases is that in many instances the precise cir-
cumstances surrounding the attack are unknown, and are therefore
only speculative.3 6' Because it is often the case that more than one
cause can act together to bring about an injury, if it can be said
that the defendant's act was a substantial factor, i.e. more proba-
ble than not, in bringing the injury about, cause in fact exists.32e
Whether an act is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury
is usually a question for the jury unless the issue is so clear that
reasonable minds could not differ.3 63 In negligence actions, the
plaintiff usually bears the burden of proof to submit evidence that
shows the defendant's conduct more likely than not was a cause in
fact of the injury.3 6 4 If the issue of cause in fact remains one of
pure speculation or conjecture, the court must direct a verdict for
the defendant.3 65  However, circumstantial evidence, common
knowledge or expert testimony can provide a basis for inferring
cause in fact. 66 A unique problem arises in workplace violence
359. Id. § 41, at 265.
360. Id. § 41, at 266; see e.g., Lopez v. McDonald's, 238 Cal. Rptr. 436, 450 (Ct. App.
1987) (security could not have prevented the attack).
361. See, e.g., E-Z Mart Stores, Inc. v. Havner, 832 S.W.2d 368, 370 (Tx. Ct. App.
1992); Vaughn v. Granite City Steel Div. of Nat'l Steel Corp., 576 N.E.2d 874, 887 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1991) (Harrison, J., dissenting).
362. KEETON Er AL., supra note 194, § 41, at 266-67.
363. Id. § 41, at 267.
364. Id. § 41, at 269.
365. Id.
366. Id. § 41, at 270.
If as a matter of ordinary experience a particular act or omission might be ex-
pected, under the circumstances, to produce a particular result, and that result in
fact has followed, the conclusion may be permissible that the causal relation ex-
ists.... [I]t is an everday experience that unlighted stairs create a danger that
someone will fall.... [W]hen a fat person tumbles down the steps, it is a reasona-
ble conclusion that it is more likely than not that the fall would not have occurred
but for the bad lighting .... Such questions are peculiarly for the jury....
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cases when considering the probative value of expert witness testi-
mony, especially involving unsolved employee homicides. Expert
testimony can only be considered when an inference to be made is
not a matter of common knowledge.3 67 "It is an easy matter to
know whether a stairway is defective and what repairs will put it in
order.., but how can one know what measures will protect against
the thug, the narcotic addict, the degenerate, the psychopath and
the psychotic? '368
Compounding the unknown deterrent issue in unsolved homi-
cide cases is the unknown identity of the perpetrator of the crime,
so even if an expert could testify as to what deters certain types of
criminals, it would be based purely on speculation that that type of
criminal committed the crime in question. Therefore, it can be ar-
gued that expert testimony serves no purpose in these cases be-
cause any inferences made are only matters of common knowledge
surrounding the facts of the case.
If the defendant's act or omission is found to be the cause in
fact of the plaintiff's injury, the court must determine whether the
defendant's act was the legal cause of the plaintiff's injury. 369 "Un-
like cause in fact, proximate cause is not a factual determination.
Rather, it involves a determination of legal policy .... ,,o Courts
usually refer to economic, moral and practical considerations to de-
termine if the defendant's act is the proximate cause of the plain-
tiff's injury. 1 Sometimes the proximate cause inquiry is put forth
as an issue of whether the defendant is under any duty to the
plaintiff, or whether the scope of the duty includes protection
against the plaintiff's particular injury.3 72
Courts advance two contrasting theories to analyze proximate
cause. First, a defendant is liable only for injuries that occur within
the scope of the foreseeable risks.37 3 Second, a defendant is liable
only for injuries that are a direct result of her actions. 37 4 The use
of flexible notions such as "foreseeability" of injury and "direct"
result require the judge or jury to evaluate the evidence.3 7 5 Al-
though the proximate cause inquiry is referred to as fact finding,
367. Id. § 41, at 269.
368. Lopez v. McDonald's, 238 Cal. Rptr. 436, 450 (Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Noble v.
Los Angeles Dodgers, Inc., 214 Cal. Rptr 395, 399 (Ct. App. 1985)).
369. KEETON Er AL., supra note 194, § 41, at 272-73.
370. Weiss, supra note 105, at 720.
371. Id. at 720-21.
372. KEETON ET AL., supra note 194, § 42, at 273.
373. Id.
374. Id. California courts reject this theory. See Pamela B. v. Hayden, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d
147, 150 n.3 (Ct. App. 1994).
375. KEETON ET AL., supra note 194, § 42, at 274.
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the conclusion is reached based on an evaluation of the facts,
which can lead to drastically different results. 3
7 6
A. Evidence of Causation
A recent case in Texas, Havner v. E-Z Mart Stores,3 " serves
as an example of the problems encountered when plaintiffs at-
tempt to prove that an employer's failure to provide adequate se-
curity to its employee was the cause of an employee's death when
circumstances surrounding the death are unknown. In Havner, E-Z
Mart conceded the issues of negligence and foreseeability, but ar-
gued that its failure to provide adequate security devices was not
the cause of the employee's death. s37
The undisputed evidence in the Havner case showed that:
[Diana] Havner was working alone at the E-Z Mart on the 11:00 p.m. to 7:00
a.m. shift. At approximately 4:47 that morning, a police officer found the
store open, but there was no clerk on the premises. Two hundred and thirty
dollars were missing from the cash register. Five days later, Havner's badly
mutilated body was found face up with the legs spread apart, and her pants
had been removed. Her skull was crushed to the point that her eyeballs and
eyesockets could not be found and one of her ears was missing.3 7 9
In an effort to prove that E-Z Mart caused Diana's death, the
Havners introduced evidence that E-Z Mart significantly reduced
security measures when it purchased the store from its previous
owner.3 80 The testimony of four expert witnesses was also
introduced. 8'
Initially, the jury found that E-Z Mart's negligence proxi-
376. Id.
377. 797 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990), rev'd, 825 S.W.2d 456 (Tex.), remanded, 832
S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
378. Havner v. E-Z Mart Stores, Inc., 825 S.W.2d 456, 459 (Tex.), remanded, 832
S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
379. 797 S.W.2d at 116.
380. 825 S.W.2d at 459. E-Z Mart reduced security by placing a countertop over the
safe rendering it inoperable as a cash control mechanism, removing two existing silent panic
alarm buttons, obstructing the windows and failing to provide security and robbery training.
Id. E-Z Mart removed two existing silent panic alarm buttons that were directly connected
to police headquarters at a cost of $8.00 per month, one under the cash register and one that
was the form of a necklace to be worn around a cashier's neck. Id. In addition, E-Z Mart
maintained a one-way telephone in the cashier area which allowed only management to
make incoming calls. Any outgoing calls had to be made from a payphone outside the store.
797 S.W.2d at 122.
381. 825 S.W.2d at 459-60. The expert witnesses testified that E-Z Mart's security sys-
tem was deficient, Diana was most likely abducted from the store and then raped and mur-
dered, the police could have arrived at the store within one minute, and that Diana would
be alive today if E-Z Mart had a security system in the store. Id.
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mately caused Diana's death and awarded damages to her two
daughters, her parents and her estate.38 2 On appeal, the appellate
court reversed, finding the evidence legally and factually insuffi-
cient to establish that E-Z Mart's negligence caused Diana's
death. 83 The appellate court noted the difficulty in determining
whether there was evidence from which reasonable minds could in-
fer that E-Z Mart's conduct was the cause in fact of Diana's death.
As significant as the evidence in this record is, equally significant is the
absence of certain evidence. This case presents many unknowns. We do not
know who the assailant was, whether he, she or they were armed, whether
Diana Havner was ordered from the premises, taken by ruse, or otherwise;
and we do not know if she was actually abducted. There is far too little
known about the causes or motivations behind the criminal acts.., to con-
clude that there is any evidence that any conduct by E-Z Mart caused the
harm to Diana Havner.3"
Hearing the case on a writ of error, the Supreme Court of
Texas reversed and found that some evidence did exist to support
the jury's finding that E-Z Mart's inadequate security was one
cause of Diana's death.38 5 The supreme court stated that the court
of appeals should not have substituted its judgment in place of the
382. 797 S.W.2d at 117.
383. Id. at 120. The appellate court was unable to conclude that E-Z Mart's conduct
was a substantial factor in bringing about Diana's death and "but for" which her death
would not have occurred. "'[I]t would be just a guess as to what subjective effect' E-Z
Mart's conduct may have had upon the criminal actor." Id. (citations omitted). The
Havners presented no evidence of probative value to support the cause in fact element of
proximate cause. The opinions given by the expert witnesses, stating that Diana would still
be alive today if a security system existed and that police would most likely have arrived
before the abduction, were dismissed as nothing more than "guess, speculation and conjec-
ture." Id. at 119. The court also negated the value of a better phone system for protection
by noting that Diana was unable to use a gun that was found in her purse at the store. Id. at
120.
384. Id. at 119 (emphasis added).
385. 825 S.W.2d at 456. The Texas Supreme Court's evaluation of the evidence was at
odds with that of the appellate court. Rejecting the notion that the experts' testimony was
"speculation" of "lay witnesses," the court stated the four witnesses were qualified as ex-
perts at trial. Id. at 460 n.4. The first expert, who taught security for seven years and au-
thored four books and over 100 articles on the subject, testified that E-Z Mart's security was
deficient. Two other witnesses, both law enforcement officials who had inspected the crime
scene and were actively involved in the investigation, had personal knowledge and expertise
to assist the fact-finders, as required by Texas' rules of evidence. Their testimony included
the opinion that Diana was taken by force from the store, and that she would be alive today
if adequate security was provided. The fourth witness, an alarm company manager and for-
mer police officer, testified the police would have had adequate time to respond and that
Diana would be alive if an alarm .system was present. Id. at 459-60. The supreme court
concluded that the testimony of each of the four experts constituted some evidence that
inadequate security caused Diana's death. Id. at 460 n.4.
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jury's judgment unless the court's theory was the only inference
that could be drawn from the evidence.38 6 The question before the
court was "whether there is any evidence from which reasonable
minds could draw an inference that the failure to provide a safe
place to work was a cause in fact of Havner's death." 7 Noting
that this evidence did exist, the court opined that to accept a con-
trary view would
make redress impossible for the family of a victim killed in an unwitnessed
occurrence regardless of the strength of the circumstantial evidence [and]
remove any legal incentive for businesses to take adequate security mea-
sures to protect employees. It would [further] deny determined law enforce-
ment officials the partnership with the private sector needed to oppose
lawlessness. 388
After the Texas Supreme Court concluded that the evidence
was legally sufficient, the case was remanded back to the appellate
court to review whether the evidence was sufficient to support the
jury's causation finding. 89 The appellate court again discounted
the expert witness testimony390 and found the evidence factually
insufficient. 91 As a result, the decision was reversed and remanded
386. Id. at 461 (emphasis added).
387. Id. at 459 (emphasis added).
388. Id. at 461.
389. Id. at 462.
390. E-Z Mart Stores, Inc., v. Havner, 832 S.W.2d 368, 372-73 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992). In
the court's opinion, the well-published security witness could not be treated as an expert
because his testimony regarding E-Z Mart's deficient security was not relevant to proximate
cause, only to the question of negligence. Id. at 373 n.10. While he was well qualified as a
security expert, he expressed no opinion on causation. Id. at 373. Also, one of the law en-
forcement officials who did testify to causation could not be an expert witness "[u]nless it
can be said that any police officer with a high school diploma and thirteen years of police
work experience is per se an expert." Id. at 372 n.6. Even if he was an expert witness, his
opinion that E-Z Mart caused Diana's death was of little weight because it was mere conjec-
ture. Id. at 372 n.7. The second law enforcement official who responded to a question on
causation stated that he believed the police would have arrived before Diana was taken out
of the store. The court declared this statement, taken in context, only indicated that Diana
may have been killed and/or raped in the store instead of being taken from the premises
and raped and killed. Id. at 372 n.6. (emphasis added). Therefore, the existence of the alarm
would not have precluded the attack.
The only opinion the court considered as evidence was that of the alarm company man-
ager. After testifying about various alarm systems, he concluded that the police would have
had an opportunity to arrive at E-Z Mart before the assailant[s] were able to steal the
money and take Diana out of the store. Id. at 373. Overall, given that no direct evidence was
offered to show causation, the court could only rely on opinions, which had little weight. Id.
at 374. "The specialized knowledge of the experts is simply of no assistance to the trier of
fact.... The jury is equally capable of engaging in the same speculation.... [T]he experts'
opinions are not helpful, but superfluous." Id. at 374 n.14 (citations omitted).
391. Id. at 374.
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for a new trial.39 2 The dissent adamantly declared that the court
failed to apply proper standards concerning inferences,93 expert
witnesses39 4 and consideration of all the evidence. 95 In addition,
the dissent echoed the supreme court's position, stating that when
possible conflicting inferences can be made, it is the responsibility
of the jury to decide, not whether the reviewing court agrees with
the jury's decision. 96
In another employer liability case discussing causation, the
Appellate Court of Illinois in Vaughn v. Granite City Steel Divi-
sion of National Steel Corp. e7 declared that to prove cause in fact
the evidence must be sufficient to afford the jury a reasonable basis
to conclude that the employer's negligence was "more likely than
not" the cause of the employee's death.398 While it was possible the
decedent had a violent encounter with a co-worker in the em-
ployer's parking lot, and that no amount of security could have
prevented the attack, the evidence in the case indicated a homicide
had occurred instead of a self-inflicted wound and experts on both
sides agreed that additional measures could have been taken to
minimize the risk to the defendant.9 The circumstantial evidence
included, inter alia, that the decedent's body was located near his
car in the employer parking lot shortly before his shift was to be-
gin, he was shot twice at close range, there were incidents of crime
against property in the parking lot, testimony of a friend and co-
worker that no one would want to kill the decedent, and expert
testimony that the parking lot security was deficient. 00 "Where
presentation of direct evidence is impossible, courts are reluctant
to conclude that verdicts based upon circumstantial evidence can-
not be upheld even though a contrary verdict could have been
reached upon the same circumstantial evidence. '401
392. Id.
393. Id. at 375-76.
394. Id. at 376-78.
395. Id. at 378-79.
396. Id. at 375. Based on the strong circumstantial evidence in this case, "can we say it
would be illogical for a jury to draw an inference from these circumstances that a robbery,
abduction and murder had occurred? Clear reasoning says we cannot.. . ." Id. Proximate
cause can be established by circumstantial evidence and the test is one of probability. "The
majority does not seek probability and does not mention probability, but instead wonders
who the perpetrator was and what his motivations might have been. These unknowns do not
thwart the ability of the jury to make a probable inference from the known facts." Id. at
376.
397. 576 N.E.2d 874 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
398. Id. at 880.
399. Id. at 881.
400. Id. at 876, 881.
401. Id. at 880 (citations omitted).
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The dissent in Vaughn voiced concerns reflective of the Texas
appellate court's viewpoint in Havner. First, the dissent declared
that under Illinois law, the court used an improper measure for
cause in fact and should have required the plaintiffs to prove with
reasonable certainty that the employer's inadequate security mea-
sures caused or contributed to the specific circumstances that led
to the death of the employee.40 2 Second, because of the absence of
evidence surrounding the murder of the decedent to ascertain the
identity of the perpetrator or the motivations underlying his ac-
tions, the dissent claimed that it was purely speculative that the
employer's inadequate security measures were linked to the em-
ployee's death.4 03 Holding the employer responsible in this case for
negligent performance of his duty to protect was "tantamount to
holding that [the employer] must be an insurer of the safety of
everyone lawfully on its premises. '404
The Illinois appellate court again considered the value of cir-
cumstantial evidence in Martin v. McDonald's Corp.40 5 The court
found a "great deal of circumstantial evidence" from which the
jury could conclude that McDonald's failure to secure the back
door was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs' injuries.40 ' The evi-
dence included an employee's testimony that, while she could not
see the intruder coming through the back door, the intruder ap-
proached her from the rear of the store.40 7 In addition, the intruder
testified that even though he was under the influence of drugs, he
remembered being attracted to the light above the back door.40 8
While there was conflicting evidence whether the back door latch
functioned properly, there was proof the door had been opened
twice after closing.40 9
While it is true that there is no direct evidence that [the intruder] entered
the store through the rear door, there is more than ample circumstantial
evidence on which the jury could conclude that [he] did indeed gain entry
* .* through the rear door and that the failure of McDonald's security pro-
cedures facilitated that entry and were thus the proximate cause of injury to
the plaintiffs.410
402. Id. at 885-86 (citations omitted).
403. Id. at 886. "[I]f the decedent's killer were one of his co-workers, the killer would
have been authorized to be in the area, and no amount of fencing or additional access con-
trol may have prevented his confrontation with the decedent." Id.
404. Id. at 887.
405. 572 N.E.2d 1073 (I1. App. Ct. 1991).
406. Id. at 1079.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id.
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B. Intervening Actors
The proximate cause analysis is difficult to understand and
becomes even more complex when other acts or actors are added to
the equation. When the acts of two parties combine to contribute
to the plaintiff's injury, then both are the proximate cause of the
injury.41' When intervening forces are involved, the force must be
evaluated to determine if it is a normal or an independent re-
sponse.412 If the intervening act is a normal response to the defend-
ant's negligent act, the chain of causation is not broken and the
defendant is liable.41 3 In contrast, if the intervening act is an inde-
pendent response to the defendant's negligent act, the chain of
causation might be broken therefore precluding liability. 414 Usu-
ally, foreseeability is used to determine whether the chain of cau-
sation is broken.41 5 If the risk of injury by the independent inter-
vening act is foreseeable, the defendant is liable.416 In contrast, if
the intervening act is highly unusual, the act is unforeseeable and
is deemed a "superseding cause" that will preclude liability.
4
'
7
However, there is no "bright line" rule for defining intervening
acts as normal or highly unusual to determine whether they are
foreseeable or not. "On a clear day some courts can foresee forever,
at least when they are looking for negligence. Others are
myopic. 418
"One's tortious conduct and others' criminal acts are strange
bedfellows." 419 Older cases generally considered intervening crimi-
nal acts as unforeseeable and therefore treated such acts as a su-
perseding cause, thus relieving a defendant of any liability for fail-
ure to protect a plaintiff from the criminal act.420 The modern view
is reflected in sections 448 and 449 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. Under section 448, a criminal act can be a superseding cause
of harm unless the criminal act was foreseeable.42' Section 449
411. Pamela B. v. Hayden, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 147, 151 (Ct. App.), superseded by, 880
P.2d 112 (Cal. 1994). This case is analyzed for discussion purposes only. The case is not
citable as authority because it was superseded.
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. Id. at 151-53.
416. Id. at 151.
417. Id.
418. Id. at 151-52 (citations omitted).
419. E-Z Mart Stores, Inc., v. Havner, No. 06-89-09797-CV, 1990 Tex. App. LEXIS
1537, at *4 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
420. Pamela B., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 152.
421. Small v. McKennan Hosp., 437 N.W.2d 194, 202 (S.D. 1989) (emphasis added).
Section 448 of the Restatement states:
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declares:
If the likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is the
hazard or one of the hazards which makes the actor negligent, such an act
whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal does not pre-
vent the actor from being liable for harm caused thereby.
422
Thus, if the defendant can foresee the risk of a criminal attack, he
cannot escape liability by declaring the criminal attack was a su-
perseding cause of the injury.423 Therefore, in jurisdictions where
foreseeability is a duty determinant, and the court subsequently
rules that a duty exists to protect the defendant based on foresee-
ability, then the issue of causation disappears. Causation is no
longer an issue because the court, by declaring the duty exists, ad-
mits that the criminal act was foreseeable, therefore no act can be
a superseding cause.424 However, in California, where foreseeability
is a duty determinant, a court recently declared that even though
the defendant owed a duty as a matter of law to the plaintiff, this
did not mean the defendant automatically, as a matter of law, was
the cause of the injury.425 Causation is a question of fact for the
jury and even though the criminal act was foreseeable, the jury still
needs to determine if the defendant's act or omission was a sub-
stantial factor in causing the injury.426
While causation remains a jury question, adoption of the mod-
ern view set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts in a juris-
diction that uses foreseeability as a duty determinant eliminates a
court's ability to use proximate cause as a means to limit liability
because it cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that a criminal act
was an independent superseding force which breaks the chain of
causation. A California appellate court in Pamela B. v. Hayden,427
acknowledged the predicament of being unable to judicially limit
liability.428 In Pamela B., a tenant was raped in an underground
The act of a third person in committing an intentional tort or crime is a supersed-
ing cause of harm to another resulting therefrom, although the actor's negligent
conduct created a situation which afforded an opportunity to the third person to
commit such a tort or crime, unless the actor at the time of his negligent conduct
realized or should have realized the likelihood that such a situation might be cre-
ated, and that a third person might avail himself of the opportunity to commit
such a tort or crime.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 448 (1965).
422. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 449 (1965).
423. Small, 437 N.W.2d at 202.
424. Pamela B., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 153.
425. Id.
426. Id. at 154.
427. 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 147 (Ct. App. 1994).
428. Id. at 158.
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parking garage of her apartment building. After affirming the $1.2
million dollar damage award against the landlord to the plaintiff,
the court opined,
These cases raise problems far beyond the legal issues resolved by
traditional rules of negligence. It is nonsense to suggest that [the]
[d]efendant's failure to change some light bulbs and fix some locks was the
cause of [the plaintiff's] injuries....
... [T]he merely negligent actor [ought not to be required] to make
monetary amends to all persons who may have suffered [at the hands of a
violent criminal who perchance committed his crime on the defendant's
property]. Experience has shown that there are clear judicial days on which
a [jury] can foresee forever and thus determine [causation,] but none on
which that foresight alone provides a socially and judicially acceptable limit
on recovery of damages for that injury. 2"
This statement emphasizes the California court's concern in
Ann M. with abandonment of the prior similar incidents rule.430
Foreseeability, as a substantial factor in a duty determination, is
crucial when combined with section 449 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts because it could eliminate the court's ability as a
matter of law to limit liability. Since California courts use a total-
ity of the circumstances test in evaluating foreseeability, there is a
greater chance foreseeability will be found or at least passed on to
a jury, therefore negating the courts' only mechanism to limit the
possibility of unlimited liability.431
A federal court of appeals judge in Doe v. Dominion Bank of
Washington, N.A.,432 voiced a similar concern when confronted
with the District of Columbia's "combination of factors '433 analysis
to evaluate foreseeability, which essentially eliminated the court's
consideration of duty and subsequent ability to preclude liability
as a matter of law.
Until the District of Columbia Court of Appeals says otherwise, it seems
reasonable to see the foreseeability requirement as a vestige of the blanket
rule against liability for the criminal acts of third parties. Though framed as
an issue relating to 'duty,' it seems, so far as landlord liability for criminal
429. Id. at 158-59 (paraphrasing a comment in Thing v. LaChusa, 717 P.2d 814 (Cal.
1989)).
430. Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 214 (Cal. 1993).
431. California courts question the outcome of cases that combine the use of foresee-
ability of a criminal attack as a duty to protect determinant and § 449 of the Restatement,
but other courts do not. See, e.g., Small v. McKennan Hosp., 437 N.W.2d 194 (S.D. 1989);
Rowe v. State Bank of Lombard, 531 N.E.2d 1358 (Ill. 1988).
432. 963 F.2d 1552 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
433. Id. at 1562 (quoting Columbia v. Doe, 524 A.2d 30, 33 (D.C. 1987)).
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acts in areas under his control is concerned, to perform no analytical work,
but merges with the proximate cause analysis. In other contexts, of course,
the duty requirement presumably continues to bar liability for the criminal
acts of third parties.43 1
CONCLUSION
Workplace violence is a serious problem that needs to be ad-
dressed. Lawmakers have recognized that the criminal justice sys-
tem can no longer be the sole caretaker of citizens' safety. As this
Article reflects, landowners and landlords are already involved in
the effort to assist the police force, but their role has not come
about voluntarily. This role arose because the courts, sometimes
with the assistance of the legislature, created a common-law duty
to protect tenants, patrons and employees of business tenants from
foreseeable criminal activity. For the same reasons a landowner is
expected to take reasonable precautions to guard against foresee-
able criminal activity, an employer should be expected to take sim-
ilar measures to protect employees.
Combining a commercial landowner's duty to protect employ-
ees of business tenants with the increasingly complex nature of
modern business relationships, commercial landowners often bear
the full cost of workplace violence through a business tenant em-
ployee's access to the tort system. This is especially inequitable if
it is the nature of the employer's business that attracts the crime.
If 'a commercial landowner is found negligent, the landlord can
protect itself by obtaining indemnification from a business tenant/
employer. However, if the court finds that it is the employer who
actually controls security of the premises through the lease, it is
the employee who then becomes the bearer of the true cost of the
injury because he is limited to workers' compensation coverage
from the employer.
The only way an employer could be forced to absorb the true
cost of an injury would be a situation where an employee could
recover in tort against a commercial landowner who was indemni-
fied by the employer. But in many of these cases the success of
recovery against the landowner would be determined by the lease
terms between the landowner and the employer. The employee's
ability to recover the true cost of the injury, then, is decided by the
bargain between the commercial landowner and the employer. The
employee's access to the tort system is further limited if his em-
ployer owns the property from which the business is conducted.
434. Id. at 1564 (Williams, J., concurring).
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In cases of workplace violence, where injuries are emotionally
damaging to the victim, workers' compensation is wholly inade-
quate as a remedy. Therefore, an injured employee or his family is
forced to bear the true cost of the injury which is attributable to
the employer's business, unless he can access the tort system
through a suit against a commercial landowner. Even then, com-
plete recovery is not guaranteed depending on the bargain between
the employer and the landowner regarding premises security and
indemnification. In addition to the inadequate recovery afforded
through workers' compensation, an employer's payment of work-
ers' compensation premiums does not serve as an adequate incen-
tive to implement security measures. In reality, workers' compen-
sation premiums are borne by the consumer. Therefore, not only
are employers not bearing the true costs of operating their busi-
ness, but the compensation premiums do not serve as a deterrent
that would prompt an employer to take reasonable security pre-
cautions to protect workers.
In light of the inadequate recovery available to victims of
workplace violence, the possibility of a landowner or employee ab-
sorbing the true cost of workplace injuries and the lack of an in-
centive for employers to implement security measures, workplace
violence cases should be removed from the exclusivity of workers'
compensation. In light of modern developments, these situations
are not part of the "bargain" envisioned between employer and
employee almost a century ago. In addition, commercial landown-
ers are being negatively affected by this bargain because employees
are seeking recovery from them in the tort system as a result of
inadequacies in workers' compensation coverage. Employers should
bear the true costs of injuries arising from the nature of their busi-
nesses. Allowing tort recovery not only would force them to bear
this cost, but would also adequately compensate the victim and
prompt employers to take an active role in protecting its
employees.
Because of the serious nature of workplace violence injuries,
courts should acknowledge that an affirmative duty exists for an
employer to take reasonable measures to protect employees arising
from a statute or through a special relationship. Voluntary under-
taking could discourage the implementation of security measures
and foreseeability is too unpredictable, therefore leading employers
to take chances on being held liable. Comprehensive legislation,
preferably from the states which can tailor guidelines to specific
communities, would be ideal because courts feel comfortable ex-
tending statutory duties and the statutes could provide a measura-
ble standard of care. The creation of a duty to protect employees
at risk would not make an employer an insurer of his employee's
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safety, because the tort system only imposes liability when an em-
ployer acts negligently. If the employer takes reasonable precau-
tions to prevent foreseeable injuries to its employees then in most
cases he will not be held liable. Further, if an employer is held
liable, he is only bearing the true cost of doing business by paying
for injuries that the business brought about. Employers also have
the ability to insure against such losses. While the tort system oc-
casionally fails and is viewed as unpredictable, it undoubtably
serves as an incentive for an employer to protect employees from
physically and emotionally dehabilitating injuries, or even death.

